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STAYING FAITHFUL TO THE STANDARDS
OF PROOF
Kevin M. Clermontt
Academics have never quite understood the standards of
proof or, indeed, much about the theory of proof Their formu-
lations beget probabilistic musings, which beget all sorts of
paradoxes, which in turn beget radical reconceptions and pro-
posals for reform. The theoretical radicals argue that the law
needs some basic reconception such as recognizing the aim of
legal proof as not at all a search for truth but rather the pro-
duction of an acceptable result, or that the law needs some
shattering reform such as greatly heightening the civil stan-
dard of proof on each part of the case to ensure a more-likely-
than-not overall result.
This Article refutes all those baroque rereadings. It shows
that the standards of proof properly understood on the law's
own terms without a probabilistic overlay, work just fine. The
law tells factfinders to compare their degree of belief in the
alleged fact to their degree of contradictory disbelief. Obeying
that instruction resolves mathematically the paradoxes that
traditional probability theory creates for itself Most surpris-
ing, the burden of proof by which the proponent must prove all
the elements and the opponent need disprove only one, does
not produce an asymmetry between the parties.
The law's standards of proof need no drastic reconception
or reform, because the law knew what it was doing all along.
It deals with factual beliefs in a world that will remain uncer-
tain, not with the odds of the facts becoming certain. And the
well-established mathematics of beliefs are not the mathemat-
ics of odds.
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INTRODUCTION
Standards of proof are a simple concept, unless you stop to
think about them. At the least, the law is quite clear in stating
standards.' Here is a pattern civil jury instruction:
Plaintiff has the burden in a civil action, such as this, to
prove every essential element of plaintiffs claim by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. If plaintiff should fail to establish
any essential element of plaintiffs claim by a preponderance
of the evidence, you should find for defendant as to that
claim.2
Doing their job, academics have stopped to think about the
standards of proof. What is a "preponderance"? The courts tell
us it means more likely true than not, which to the academics
means more probable than not, which thus calls for use of
traditional probability theory.3 The routinely taught result ap-
1 See Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of Persuasion i Civil Cases:
Algorithms v. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 893, 897-904 (criticizing Dale
A. Nance, Commentary, A Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a Mathematical
Interpretation of the Logic of Trials, 66 B.U. L. REv. 947, 949-51 (1986) (finding the
pattern jury instruction ambiguous)).
2 3 KEviN F. O'MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE
AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 104.01 (6th ed. 2011). The pattern jury instruction also
verbalizes the process imposed implicitly on the judge when acting as factfinder.
3 See, e.g., Brown v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 342, 345 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he trier of
fact rules for the plaintiff if it thinks the chance greater than 0.5 that the plaintiff
is in the right."); THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 302-03 (3d ed.
2017) (giving a straightforward and uncritical account of the probabilistic ap-
proach); Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J.
1254, 1256 (2013) ("As every first-year law student knows, the civil preponder-
1458 [Vol. 104:1457
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pears below, showing the pull and haul of the plaintiffs and
defendant's evidence, E, on a disputed issue, as plaintiffs case
in chief establishes the fact as more likely than not and then
the case in defense pushes the probability back down:
aT loses n wins
ETC
50%
We are off and running-right off a cliff. The traditional
probabilistic model4 immediately introduces paradoxes, puz-
zles, and problems galore:
1. Unrealisticfactftnding. Probabilistic thinking induces one
to speak in quantified terms, even as one simultaneously
admits that probability percentages are not how people
naturally think.5 Speaking in numerical terms can only
mislead the factfinder.6 For example, it is silly to speak in
terms of a razor's edge at 50%. A human factfinder can-
not tell 49% from 51%. Equipoise is a fuzzy zone in the
factfinder's mind.7
2. Prior probability. The academics' cure for a lack of realism
is to speak in ever more sophisticated terms, urging
ance-of-the-evidence standard requires that a plaintiff establish the probability of
her claim to greater than 0.5.").
4 By traditional probability, I am referring to the classical, frequentist, and
subjective systems conforming to Kolmogorov's axiomatization. See Alan Hajek,
Interpretations of Probability, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 1 (Edward
N. Zalta ed., 2012), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/
[https://perma.ce/HAV8-QNFMI (listing the axioms of nonnegativity, normaliza-
tion, and additivity). But the usual particularization of probability for discussing
legal proof is subjective probability. See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, STANDARDS OF DECI-
SION IN LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL BASES FOR THE STANDARD OF PROOF, HERE AND
ABROAD 120-21 (2013) (discussing probability theories); Hajek, supra, § 3.3.1
(characterizing subjectivism, unfortunately, with the slogan of "Probability is de-
gree of belief").
5 See CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 68-75 (explaining why humans perform
probabilistic tasks quite weakly).
6 See id. at 75-78, 113-14 (describing potential problems from quantifying
decisionmaking standards, such as difficulty in meshing numbers with unquanti-
fled variables; also, "there is no convincing reason to expect that quantification
would effectively invoke our nonprecise internal scale of judgment, or otherwise
accord with the ingrained way of human thinking").
7 See id. at 18-23 (establishing that equipoise embodies a range of frequently
occurring cases, not just the precise point of 50/50).
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Bayes' theorem for discussions of factfinding in recent
decades.8 Bayes tells us that we need to start with a prior
probability, which the admitted evidence will alter. In the
proper state of initial ignorance in a civil case, the plain-
tiffs claim has a 50/50 chance. Consequently, even
though it comports with neither the actual probabilities
nor the law's instructions, a popular starting point for
the Bayesian factfinder is 50%.9 But among other diffi-
culties, 1 0 this prior probability would make the standard
of proof ridiculously easy for the plaintiff to satisfy. Intro-
ducing a feather's weight of evidence would arguably suf-
fice to carry the burden of production, as well as the
burden of persuasion over a silent defendant. We all
know the law is otherwise:" the rule on judgment as a
matter of law requires plaintiffs evidence to create at
least a reasonable possibility. 12
3. Irfinite alternatives. By contrast, the infinite range of pos-
sibilities alternative to the plaintiffs allegations would
seem to make the plaintiffs burden nearly impossible to
carry. Even if one invokes contextualism to pare down
the range of plausible alternatives, one might still argue
that almost no plaintiff could tell a story more than 50%
true, given the theoretical difficulty of proving the truth
by dissipating all the remaining alternatives. 13 Indeed, in
8 See id. at 120-21 (laying out the basics of Bayes' theorem); Richard
Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof 66 B.U. L.
REV. 439, 440-50 (1986) (championing Bayesianism). See generally SHARON
BERTSCH MCGRAYNE, THE THEORY THAT WOULD NOT DIE (2011) (recounting the centu-
ries of controversy generated by Bayes' theorem).
9 See Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Traditional Probability, Relative Plausibil-
ity, or Belief Function?, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 353, 368-69 (2015) [hereinafter
Clermont, Belief Function] (discussing the situation of a lack of proof). On
problems with choosing another prior probability, see Leonard R. Jaffee, OfProba-
tivity and Probability: Statistics, Scientific Evidence, and the Calculus of Chance at
Trial, 46 U. Pirr. L. REV. 925, 980-85 (1985).
10 See State v. Spann, 617 A.2d 247, 254 (N.J. 1993) (".5 assumed prior
probability clearly is neither neutral nor objective. . . ."); Lempert, supra note 8, at
462-67 (noting that employing 50/50 as the appropriate odds when ignorant of
the true facts can cause many problems).
11 See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 338, at 654 (7th ed. 2013) ("A 'scintilla' of
evidence will not suffice.").
12 See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 50(a) (stating standard of decision as whether "a
reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the
party on that issue").
13 See Michael S. Pardo, Second-Order ProofRules, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1083, 1093
(2009) ("If the plaintiff must prove that some fact, X, is more probable than its
negation, not-X, then the plaintiff should have to show not only the probability
that the state of the world is such that X is true, but also the probability of every
other possible state of the world in which X is not true. This would mean that in
order to prevail, plaintiffs would have to disprove (or demonstrate the low likeli-
hood of) each of the virtually limitless number of ways the world could have been
at the relevant time. This would be a virtually impossible task, and thus, absent
1460 [Vol. 104:1457
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many other ways tied to the idea that the plaintiff must
prove each element while the defendant need disprove
only one, traditional probability theory suggests that
plaintiffs are in an asymmetrically disadvantaged posi-
tion. If the procedural system were so slanted, it could
never deliver on its promise of neutrality.1 4
4. Element-by-elenent factflnding. Error-cost minimization
would seem to tell us to apply the standard of proof to the
plaintiffs whole story. The plaintiffs tale of liability
should be more likely than all versions of nonliability. Yet
the pattern jury instruction says to proceed element-by-
element, seeming to render critical how finely the law
divides a claim into elements. Troublingly, probability's
product rule says that each element's being more proba-
ble than not is no guarantee of efficiency's requirement
that the elements' conjunction be more probable than
not.' 5 Any proper model of the standards of proof must
resolve this key theoretical paradox.'6 Ultimately, the
takeaway will be that probabilism fails not only as a
description of how humans find facts, but also as an
aspiration of how the ideal factfinder should proceed.
5. Standards' purposes. Most importantly, traditional
probability theory departs from the standards' purposes.
The standards, as developed and deployed by the courts,
never embraced the spirit of probability, 7 even when
conclusive proof, plaintiffs would lose." (footnote omitted)); cf. Patrick Rysiew,
Epistemic Contextualisrn, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 3.3 (Edward
N. Zalta ed., 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contextualism-epistemol-
ogy/ [https://perma.cc/CL5K-JB8Z] (formulating a response to the skeptical
argument).
14 See infra Part III (discussing apparent asymmetries).
15 See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1385-88 (1985) (illustrating the
product rule). For independent events a and b, the product rule says that the
probability of conjoined events is the product of the events' probabilities. For
interdependent events, the probability operation for conjunction is p(a) multiplied
by p(b-a), so it is still multiplicative.
16 The conjunction paradox lies in this: Assume that a civil plaintiff needs to
prove two elements, a and b. He proves element a to 70% and b to 60%, whatever
that means. According to American law he wins, having proven each element by a
preponderance. Paradoxically, he should lose according to American law profes-
sors, supposedly because he has proven the conjunction of a and b to only 42%.
See Kevin M. Clermont, Conjunction of Evidence and Multivalent Logic, in LAW AND
THE NEW LOGIcS 32 (H. Patrick Glenn & Lionel D. Smith eds., 2017) [hereinafter
Clermont, Fuzzy Logic] (resolving the conjunction paradox).
17 See Sargent v. Mass. Accident Co., 29 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Mass. 1940) (defin-
ing preponderance to require that "it is made to appear more likely or probable in
the sense that actual belief in its truth, derived from the evidence, exists in the
mind or minds of the tribunal notwithstanding any doubts that may still linger
there"); Lampe v. Franklin Am. Trust Co., 96 S.W.2d'710, 723 (Mo. 1936) ("The
trouble with [a probability instruction] is that a verdict must be based upon what
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:1457
they often spoke in the words of probability. ' 8 The law is
looking more for some sort of internal conviction on the
part of its factfinders.'9
Let me expand on that last point, which is the subject of
this Article. I am not arguing against the academics' trying to
get below the surface, or against future sophisticated thinking
about the proof standards. I am arguing that traditional
probability does not provide what we want from standards.
Why not?
Traditional probability's fatal defect for this purpose is
that, unbeknownst to most of us, it is built on an assumption
of bivalence. That is, like classical logic, it assumes that facts
must be treated as either true or false.20 Probability of truth in
the jury finds to be facts rather than what they find to be 'more probable.'. . .This
means merely that the party, who has the burden of proof, must produce evi-
dence, tending to show the truth of those facts, 'which is more convincing to them
as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.'" (quoting
Rouchene v. Gamble Constr. Co., 89 S.W.2d 58, 63 (Mo. 1935)); Anderson v. Chi.
Brass Co., 106 N.W. 1077, 1080 (Wis. 1906) (saying preponderant evidence "must
be such as to satisfy or convince the minds of the jury of the truth of his conten-
tion"); John Leubsdorf, The Surprising History of the Preponderance Standard of
Civil Proof 67 FLA. L. REV. 1569, 1595-99 (2015) (discussing early formulations of
degrees of belief); Richard W. Wright, Haack on Legal Proof, 68 ESTUDIOS
FILOSOFIcos 517, 523 (2018) ("[Tihe references in the great majority ofjury instruc-
tions in the United States to persuasion, conviction or belief in the truth of the
facts at issue in the particular case, based on evidence specific to that case, are
inconsistent with a standard of proof based on mathematical probability.").
18 See 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 11, § 339 (citing many cases).
19 See infra text accompanying notes 52-57 (explaining nature of belief). Inci-
dentally, in the absence of Bayesian legal academics, civilian jurists speak with-
out much opposition in terms of intime conviction, which is a peculiarly strong
belief. See Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards
of Proof 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 245-51, 269-74 (2002) (explaining intime convic-
tion); Mark Klamberg, Epistemological Controversies and Evaluation of Evidence in
Interrational Criminal Trials, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAw (Kevin Jon Heller et al. eds., forthcoming 2019) (minimizing differences
among civilian views); Mark Schweizer, The Civil Standard of Proof-What Is It,
Actually?, 20 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 217, 218 (2016) (exploring what standard
civil jurists actually apply).
20 See Clermont, Fuzzy Logic, supra note 16, at 36-40 (describing assump-
tions of classical logic and observing: "This multivalent form of logic boldly de-
clines the simplification offered by two-valued, or bivalent, logic built on a
foundation of true/false with an excluded middle. It instead recognizes partial
truths. Both a proposition and its opposite can be true to a degree."). The seman-
tic principle of bivalence holds that a proposition P is either true or false. Thus,
not-P is not divided into further sets, but constitutes a single set called false. This
principle underlies two-valued logic. It is indeed the intended (although not neces-
sary) meaning, or semantic, of all classical logic, so that classical logic tends to
induce bivalent thinking. Classical logic's slightly different, syntactic law of the
excluded middle holds, as a matter of grammatical structure, that a proposition P
is either true or not true; thus, in the universe of men, a person can be tall or not
tall, rather than simply either tall or short. Bivalence implies the law of the
1462
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this black-and-white world, p, provides the chance of the fact
being revealed as true. Moreover, the probability of the fact
being revealed as false is the complement, I-p. Thinking in
terms of the odds of certain truth or falsity produces all of the
above five difficulties.
As this Article will develop, my first critical correction is
away from bivalence and toward multivalence for the purposes
of factfinding. Under multivalent logic, factfinders can believe
facts as partly true, ranging in degree from zero to one.2 1 Legal
factfinding should not aim to measure the probability of biva-
lent truth but rather to measure a partial conviction or belief
established by the evidence. It is upon a belief in truth that the
law should proceed.
My second critical correction is that, given imperfect evi-
dence, the factfinder will leave some of its belief uncommitted
when forming some degree of belief that the fact is true and
some degree of belief that the fact is false. The committed belief
and disbelief will add to less than one.2 2
excluded middle, but the converse is not true. See Peter Suber, Non-Contradiction
and Excluded Middle (1997), http://www.earlham.edu/-peters/courses/logsys/
pnc-pem.htm [https://perma.cc/S94C-Y49V].
21 See generally GRAHAM PRIEST, AN INTRODUCTION TO NON-CIASSIcAL LOGIC:
FROM IF TO Is (2d ed. 2008) (discussing multivalent logic and the excluded middle);
Siegfried Gottwald, Many-Valued Logic, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-manyval
ued/ [https://perma.cc/LB9M-MVE7]. Multivalent logic rejects as an assumption
the law of the excluded middle.
22 Indeed, the belief function system is nonadditive. Additivity is one of tradi-
tional probability's three basic Kolmogorov axioms: "If two events cannot happen
jointly, the probability that one or the other occurs is equal to the sum of their
separate probabilities." TERENCE ANDERSON, DAVID SCHUM & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALY-
SIS OF EVIDENCE 251 (2d ed. 2005). In an additive system, a set and its complement
add to the universe, or one. Thus, the probability that an event will happen and
the probability that it will not happen add to one. See RAFIK AZIZ ALIEV, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF THE FUZZY LOGIC-BASED GENERALIZED THEORY OF DECISIONS 106, 108-09
(2013) (contrasting additive with nonadditive probability systems, and also show-
ing belief functions to be nonadditive); ANDERSON ET AL., supra, at 254 ("[Tihis
additivity requirement puts a burden on you that you might not be willing to
accept. The conventional system of probability requires that you must always
commit all of your probabilistic belief to mutually exclusive and exhaustive
events; you cannot hold back any of your belief or leave it uncommitted."); CLER-
MONT, supra note 4, at 151, 187, 203 (considering the effect of nonadditivity on
legal proof); BENGT LINDELL, MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS IN LEGAL REASONING 154 (2017)
(calling additive and nonadditive probabilities, respectively, two-sided and one-
sided probabilities); Rolf Haenni, Non-Additive Degrees of Belief in DEGREES OF
BELIEF 121, 123 (Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri eds., 2009) (arguing
"that the extreme case of total ignorance . .. should never lead to degrees of belief
different from zero," so that belief and disbelief are both zero, "which is a particu-
lar case of the non-additivity assumption Bel(h) + Bel(-,h) < 1" and which means
that "a proper distinction between uncertainty and ignorance" can exist); Ron A.
Shapira, Economic Analysis of the Law of Evidence: A Caveat, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
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In sum, the choice comes down to probability of truth ver-
sus belief in truth. Factfinders can, do, and should focus on the
latter. The standards of proof were never meant to deal with the
betting odds of discovering truth with certainty, which is all
that a bivalent model can deliver. The standards instead oper-
ate on multivalent degrees of belief.
This Article circles back from the frontiers of standards'
theory where I have been exploring for thirty years,23 and now
tries to explain all in lawyer-friendly terms while extending my
prior work. Part I will explain my multivalent-belief model of
standards of proof, which is a nonradical elaboration of the
existing law. Part II will extend my work by introducing the
many radical models propounded to resolve the obvious diffi-
culties with the popular probabilistic model; the most fruitful is
inference to the best explanation, whose legal offspring turns
out to be merely a variation of the multivalent-belief model but
one that triggers some valuable insights. Part III will then show
how the multivalent-belief model, illuminated by those in-
sights, resolves the plaintiff/defendant asymmetries that the
probabilistic model falsely suggests.
I
MULTIVALENT BELIEFS
One must begin by locating the topic of standards of proof
within the subject of factfinding. As the very first step, "fact"
can include anything that a court, other institution, or a per-
son subjects to a proof process in order to establish what to
treat as truth. The subject includes not only yes-or-no facts but
also vague and normative terms like "fault" and many other
applications of law to fact, as well as a variety of nonbinary
opinions.2 4 Nonetheless, discussion remains easiest when fo-
1607, 1613-16 (1998) (distinguishing additive from nonadditive). However, in a
multivalent system that rejects the law of the excluded middle, a set can overlap
its complement, which means that neither of the excluded middle's consequences
(additivity and noncontradiction) prevails. See Timothy J. Ross & W. Jerry Parkin-
son, Fuzzy Set Theory, Fuzzy Logic, and Fuzzy Systems, in FUZZY LOGIC AND
PROBABILITY APPLICATIONS 29, 33-34 (Timothy J. Ross et al. eds., 2002) (discussing
fuzzy logic); supra note 20 (discussing excluded middle).
23 See CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 5 n.4 (laying out my position, while citing
my series of seven previously published articles on standards of proof that began
in 1987). Since that 2013 book, I have written three supplementary articles:
Clermont, Belief Function, supra note 9; Clermont, Fuzzy Logic, supra note 16;
Kevin M. Clermont, Common Sense on Standards of Proof 48 SETON HALL L. REV.
1057 (2018) [hereinafter Clermont, Common Sense].
24 C RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR
A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1555-63, 1628-31 (12th ed. 2017) (defining
"fact" for ji ry and appeal); William W Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the
[Vol. 104:14571464
20191 STAYING FAITHFUL TO THE STANDARDS PROOF 1465
cusing mainly on the legal task of finding a historical fact that
constitutes a single element of a claim or defense.
Next, if one divides the legal factfinders' task into a
processing phase and an evaluating phase, the specific topic of
standards of proof arises in the latter phase. Law imposes no
enforceable restraints on the first phase's processing of pieces
of evidence (El, E2, etc.). Logicians have not managed to agree
on how evidence should get processed.25 Psychologists have
made limited progress in figuring out how evidence actually
gets processed. Cognition here remains a black box. The actual
process may be rational26 or intuitive, 27 although it should
involve so-called critical common sense.28 It may proceed at-
Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 469-80
(1984) (doing the same for judgment as a matter of law).
25 See Symposium, Artificial Intelligence and Judicial Proof 22 CARDozo L.
REv. 1365, 1365-67 (2001) (working on the need to formalize evidence processing
for application of "computational intelligence"); James Franklin, How Much of
Commonsense and Legal Reasoning Is Formalizable? A Review of Conceptual Ob-
stacles, 11 LAw, PROBABILITY & RISK 225, 245 (2012) (taking a pessimistic view on
formalizing common reasoning).
26 See, e.g., Edmund M. Morgan, Introduction to Evidence, in AUSTIN W. Scorr
& SIDNEY P. SIMPSON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 941, 943-45
(1950) (discussing the logical methods jurors use to process evidence). "Rational"
means logical. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 56 ("[A] conclusion based
upon the evidence can only be justified as rational through the use of [deductive,
inductive, or abductive] logic."); see also WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE:
EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 75-80 (2d ed. 2006) (describing the common law's so-called
Rationalist Tradition).
27 See, e.g., Mark Spottswood, The Hidden Structure of Fact-Finding, 64 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 131, 171-93 (2013) (applying the dual-process psychological
framework to legal factfinding). "Intuition" is analyzed in LINDELL, supra note 22,
at 80-97.
28 See D. Michael Risinger, Searching for Truth in the American Law of Evi-
dence and Proof 47 GA. L. REV. 801, 813 (2013) (discussing "the notion of critical
common sense and its attendant implication that participation in rational
factfinding about legal issues is possible for most humans of normal intelligence").
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:1457
omistically29 or holistically.3 0 It needs to combine into a single
measure all sorts of evidence on all sorts of facts, ranging from
likelihood of uncertain occurrence to vague normative charac-
29 American law seems to envisage an element-by-element approach. See
Marijke Malsch & Ian Freckelton, The Evaluation of Evidence: Differences Between
Legal Systems, in LEGAL EVIDENCE AND PROOF: STATISTICs, STORIES, LOGIC 117,
130-31 (Hendrik Kaptein et al. eds., 2009) (linking the adversary system to atom-
ism). One atomistic approach envisaged by psychology is information integration
theory. According to this theory, the human decisionmaker making a finding on
an element's existence would begin with an initial impression, or predisposition,
and then would process additional pieces of information. Each of these, including
the initial impression, would receive a scale value, which is a measure of the
evidenced likelihood of the element's existence. Each would also receive a weight-
ing factor, which is a measure of evidential importance that takes into account
both weight and credibility. The decisionmaker would then combine these into a
weighted average that determines the element's likelihood. See Martin F. Kaplan,
Cognitive Processes in the Individual Juror, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM
197 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982) (explaining information
integration).
30 American practice seems to follow a holistic approach. See Dan Simon, A
Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 511, 559-69 (2004) (arguing that factfinders consider evidence holis-
tically rather than atomistically). Holistic methodologies are typified by the well-
known story model, which posits that the factfinder would judge the likelihood of
the proponent's whole story rather than judging its parts separately. See ANDER-
SON ET AL., supra note 22, at 280 ("Empirical research . . . suggests that American
juries determine 'the truth' about alleged past events mainly by constructing ...
stories rather than critically evaluating arguments from evidence. These findings
have been confirmed in other disciplines (e.g., medical diagnosis and history) and
extended to fact determination by legal professionals and the police . . . . Simply
put, the widely accepted thesis is that human beings need stories in order to make
certain kinds of decisions and, more generally, to make sense of the world."); Dan
Simon, Thin Empirics, 23 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 82 (2019) (clarifying the
distinction between holism and the story model). See generally JEFFREY T. FREDER-
ICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN JURY 296-99 (1987) (providing a brief over-
view of the story model of evidence processing); Reid Hastie & Nancy Pennington,
The Psychology of Juror and Jury Decision Making, in REID HASTIE, STEVEN D.
PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 15, 22-23 (1983) (providing a brief
summary of empirical studies supporting the story model); Paula L. Hannaford,
Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Mott & G. Thomas Munsterman, The Timing of Opinion
Formation by Jurors in Civil Cases: An Empirical Examination, 67 TENN. L. REV.
627, 629-33 (2000) (discussing three predominant models of jury decisionmak-
ing); Reid Hastie, What's the Story? Explanations and Narratives in Civil Jury
Decisions, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE 23, 31-32 (Brian H. Bornstein et al.
eds., 2008) (expanding the story model to allow for a party's multiple stories); Jill
E. Huntley & Mark Costanzo, Sexual Harassment Stories: Testing a Story-Medi-
ated Model of Juror Decision-Making in Civil Litigation, 27 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 29,
29 (2003) (presenting research that "extends the story model to civil litigation and
tests a story-mediated model against an unmediated model ofjury decision-mak-
ing"); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Modelfor Juror Decision Making,
in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192 (Reid Hastie
ed., 1993) (detailing the story model and summarizing empirical studies testing
it).
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terization of blameworthiness. 3 1 The best view based on psy-
chology, and introspection, posits that factfinders process the
weight and credibility of the evidence largely by intuition and in
an approximate and nonquantified way, perhaps while looking
at the whole case at once. They then take a stab at forming a
belief in the truth. The stabs seem to be generally reliable.
Happily, however, the persistent blackness of the cognitive box
is not an impediment for present purposes because, it will turn
out, the particular methodology followed by the factfinders in
processing the evidence does not affect the proper working of
the standards of proof.3 2
Processing Evaluating
E2
E3 belief -standard of proof decision
E4
Getting to the evaluation phase whereby belief leads to
legal decision, psychologists have thus far had little to contrib-
ute to our understanding of the standards of proof. Philosophy
and logic take over here, dictating the standards to achieve
policy goals. The law accordingly specifies by its standards the
measure of sureness required for decision about fact in an
uncertain world.
A final step in orientation is to observe that what my theory
holds as to standards of proof for past events does not spill over
to other standards of decision in law. The unique feature of the
standard of proof is that we expect the factfinder to retain
uncommitted belief in the decisionmaking process. When a
decisionmaker employs other standards, even the standard of
review, we expect it roughly but directly to estimate probability
and measure the estimate against the given standard. We do
not expect the judges to retain uncommitted belief in applying
a standard of review, because the "evidence" for applying the
standard is deemed complete. We want from the judges the
likelihood of legal error in the lower court's deciding for the
31 see CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 157-66 (discussing the need for a common
currency); infra note 113 (discussing statistical evidence).
32 See infra text accompanying note 116 ("[1t makes irrelevant whether the
evidence processing stage proceeded holistically or atomistically, or whether it
ended in a stab at forming a belief or in something more rigorous."). However, I
provide at least a structure for factfinding tnfra notes 118-120.
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winner, with the complement being the likelihood of legal cor-
rectness in deciding for the winner.3 3
A. How Should We Conceive What the Factfinder Finds?
I have been using "belief" to characterize the output of
evidence processing. Is that appropriate? Philosophy is of as-
sistance here. But philosophers like to start upstream. They
might pick up my inquiry at the "correspondence theory,"
which states that what goes on in our heads should correspond
to an external reality.3 4 The law seemingly buys into this theory
as an assumption.3 5
What is "truth" then? Truth is the condition where a state-
ment accurately reflects that external world.3 6 Thus, a state-
ment is true if and only if it corresponds to the reality it
describes.3 7
33 See CLERMONT, supra note 4. at 141-44 (establishing the uniqueness of the
standards of proof among the many varieties of standards of decision). Another
example, besides the standard of review, is the trial judge's application of the
standard for judgment as a matter of law. See Clermont, Belief Function, supra
note 9, at 381 n.87 ("We want from the judge the likelihood ofjury error in finding
for the plaintiff, with the complement being the likelihood that the jury has au-
thority to find for the plaintiff.").
34 See ANDREW NEWMAN, THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH: AN ESSAY ON
THE METAPHYSICS OF PREDICATION 1 (2002) ("The simplest version of the correspon-
dence theory of truth is that a proposition or a sentence is true when it corre-
sponds to an appropriate fact, which is something in the world that makes a
proposition or a sentence true."); Marian David, The Correspondence Theory of
Truth, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/ [https://perma.cc/
3J4M-KXD3].
35 See H.L. HO, A PHILOSOPHY OF EVIDENCE IAW: JUSTICE IN THE SEARCH FOR
TRUTH 55 (2008) ("That primary facts exist as external realities is a basic assump-
tion that renders the purpose of a trial intelligible."); Risinger, supra note 28, at
811 ("The shared assumptions of the standard rationalist model allowed (and
continue to allow) both practitioners and the vast majority of descriptive academ-
ics to skip over many issues that might interest professional philosophers, enter-
ing the discourse concerning truth at a point where thorny epistemological issues
have been resolved by assumption, since such controversies are unimportant to
the law as a practical discipline. As a practical matter, we assume the reality of an
exterior material world; arguing either radical skepticism or the primacy of some
form of philosophical idealism will not cut any ice in a courtroom."); cf CLERMONT,
supra note 4, at 136 (discounting the coherence theory as a competitor to the
correspondence theory in legal theory).
36 See TIMOTHY M. MOSTELLER, THEORIES OF TRUTH: AN INTRODUCTION (2014) (dis-
cussing various definitions of truth); David, supra note 34, § 2.3 (similar). But see
Zachary Halaschak, Biden Tells Iowans: "We Choose Truth over Facts," WASH.
EXAMINER, Aug. 8, 2019, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/truth-
over-facts-biden-fumbles-during-iowa-speech [https://perma.cc/DZE7-8YV7
(quoting gaffe).
37 See David, supra note 34, § 3 ("x is true iff x corresponds to some fact
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What is "knowledge"? As Plato classically put it, knowledge
is a justified true belief.38 We know something if and only if
both it is true3 9 and we are justified in believing it. At least in its
modern sense, "belief" is the mental acceptance of a statement
as true.40 "Justification" lies in having reasons in evidence and
logic for the belief.4 1
Is legal proof aimed at either certain truth or full knowl-
edge? No, they are unattainable in the legal world, even if we
frequently say one aim of the legal process is knowing the
truth.42 Legal proof of historical fact proceeds mainly by induc-
tive logic.4 3 Accumulating observations can fortify a hypothe-
sis. But additional observations can never verify a fact to the
38 See Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Matthias Steup, The Analysis of Knowl-
edge, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2017),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/
KP8H-DZY2] ("There are three components to the traditional ('tripartite') analysis
of knowledge."); Matthias Steup, Epistemology, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHI-
LOSOPHY § 1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2005), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epis-
temology/ [https://perma.cc/6484-WEX2] (treating knowledge as the subject of
epistemology); Michael S. Pardo, Group Agency and Legal Proof, or, Why the Jury
Is an "It," 56 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1793, 1812-14 (2015) (explaining that for
knowledge, the justified true belief cannot be accidentally true, following Edmund
L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121 (1963)); cf.
Ichikawa & Steup, supra, § 11 (discussing the knowledge-first view of TIMOTHY
WILLIAMSON, KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS (2000), that knowledge is a fundamental
state not subject to further analysis).
39 There cannot be knowledge without truth. See PLATO, THEAETETUS 20lb-c
(c. 369 B.C.), http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=perseus%3Atext
%3A1999.01.0172%3Atext/o3DTheaet.%3Asection%3D201b [https://perma.cc/
9NEB-8F8J] ("Socrates: Then when judges are justly persuaded about matters
which one can know only by having seen them and in no other way, in such a
case, judging of them from hearsay, having acquired a true opinion of them, they
have judged without knowledge, though they are rightly persuaded, if the judge-
ment they have passed is correct, have they not?"); Pardo, supra note 38, at 1812
("[An agent's knowledge of X requires that X be true.").
40 See Ichikawa & Steup, supra note 38, § 1.2 (elaborating belief); Jessica
Moss & Whitney Schwab, The Birth of Belief 57 J. HIST. PHIL. 1, 2-3 (2019)
("[Tihere is nowadays a widely accepted notion of belief as the generic attitude of
taking something to be the case or taking something to be true. Taking' here
refers not to a provisional attitude, but to one of endorsement or commitment."
(footnotes omitted)).
41 See Steup, supra note 38, § 2 (elaborating justification).
42 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 102 ("These rules should be construed so as to adminis-
ter every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and pro-
mote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and
securing a just determination."); see Risinger, supra note 28, at 802-17 (explain-
ing how the law's Rationalist Tradition buys into truth as an aim, but accepts
probability as a way of acknowledging uncertainty).
43 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 100 ("In analyzing the available
evidential data and identifying and marshaling the inferences that those data
support in preparing for trial, the lawyer relies primarily on inductive reasoning.");
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF § 9 (3d ed. 1937) (same).
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point of proven certainty, even if a single observation can effec-
tively falsify the fact. Of course, this situation troubled David
Hume no end.4 Yet this situation causes the law no worry
because the law does not seek or demand complete truth or
knowledge .4
Now, I am not veering off into postmodernism, where objec-
tive truth can become irrelevant or cease to exist.4 6 The law
does value truth in factfinding, but realizes that it will never get
completely there. Retaining a veritistic even if not veracious
goal, the law must find a way to operate practically, upon less
than certainty. To allow forming beliefs in truth, the law em-
braces naturalized epistemology. This branch of epistemology
incorporates the social sciences' learning on individuals'
mental processing under social influence.4 7
Naturalized epistemology further recognizes that knowl-
edge can comprise beliefs that were produced by a reliable
means to seek truth.4 8 Does the law employ a reliable means?
44 See Leah Henderson, The Problem of Induction, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY § 1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/en-
tries/induction-problem/ [https://perma.cc/A8RX-MRS9] ("The original source
of what has become known as the 'problem of induction' is in Book 1, part 1ii,
section 6 of A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, published in 1739.").
45 See L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 351-56 (1977)
(rejecting Hume's skepticism as applied to legal factfinding).
46 See Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law
of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1492 (2001) (lamenting "the unfortunate fasci-
nation in some quarters of the legal academy with 'postmodem' conceptions of
knowledge and truth, conceptions notable for their superficiality and for the fact
that almost no philosophers subscribe to them").
47 See ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION 9 (1986) ("The multidis-
ciplinary conception of epistemology I like to call epistemics, to distinguish it from
other, more autonomous, conceptions of the field."); Allen & Leiter, supra note 46,
at 1493-501 (explaining empirically based naturalized epistemology in the con-
text of the law of evidence and contending that "naturalized epistemology provides
a fruitful way of understanding evidence law"); Pardo, supra note 38, at 1810-16
(extending the theory's reach to group factfinding); Steup, supra note 38, § 6.2
(describing extreme and moderate versions of naturalized epistemology). An alter-
native route to relaxing the standards for knowledge lies in the recent emergence
of contextualism. See Rysiew, supra note 13, § 1.
48 Classical epistemology treats a belief as justified "when it is reasonable or
rational, from Ss own point of view, to take p to be true. According to evidential-
ism, what makes a belief justified in this sense is the possession of evidence."
Steup, supra note 38, § 1.1. Nonclassical epistemology, like naturalized episte-
mology, "conceives of the role of justification differently. Its job is to ensure that
S's belief has a high objective probability of truth and therefore, if true, is not true
merely because of luck. One prominent idea is that this is accomplished if, and
only if, a belief originates in reliable cognitive processes or faculties. This view is
known as reliabilisn." Id.; see Allen & Leiter, supra note 46, at 1494-95 (discuss-
ing Goldman's reliabilism); cf Risinger, supra note 28, at 811 ("In [law], we as-
sume that knowledge (or something counting as knowledge) about past events is
1470
2019] STAYING FAITHFUL TO THE STANDARDS PROOF 1471
Yes, somewhat,49 but legal factfinding's methods have always
been a bit peculiar in two regards.5 0
First, the law depends on the parties to present the evi-
dence to the factfinder. Accordingly, the legal factfinder decides
by making a choice between the two positions of belief and
disbelief in the proponent's position. Thus, while the resulting
belief in truth is justified within its limited scope, it is merely a
relative belief. This quality of relativity likely disqualifies the
belief from the strict status of knowledge.
Second, the law demands a decision now. It cannot leave
decision for another day. Other disciplines can leave a question
open, or call a result statistically insignificant, and await more
evidence and greater certainty to emerge. But legal actors (and
all of us in our daily lives) often must come to an immediate
decision. Moreover, the resulting belief is a tentative one, in
that it will rest on evidence that is imperfect at the time deci-
sion must be made. This quality of tentativeness likely also
disqualifies the belief from the strict status of knowledge.5 1
A relative and tentative belief is not even a belief, at least in
the categorical sense of mental acceptance of a fact as true.5 2
But a legal factfinder can arrive at a partial belief, a "degree of
belief" that measures the strength of belief in the truth of the
fact. 53A degree of belief can coexist with a degree of disbelief as
possible, even if it is not perfect. Platonic arguments about how perfection is
necessary to the concept of true knowledge are beside the point.").
49 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124, 1154 (1992) ("Apparently,
judge trial and jury trial combine to operate a decisionmaking system that is, at
least in [its ability to treat like cases alike], highly reliable."); Thomas B. Metzloff,
Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury's Shadow, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1991, at 43 (showing trial system's usual competence and fairness
by an empirical comparison of medical malpractice verdicts and insurers' pretrial
evaluations).
50 See Sophie Grace Chappell, Plato on Knowledge in the Theaetetus, in STAN-
FORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 7.6 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2013), https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-theaetetus/ [https://perma.cc/G377-TNXT]
("Plato seems to offer two incompatible explanations of why the jury don't know:
first that they have only a limited time to hear the arguments (20 1b3, 172e 1); and
second that their judgement is second-hand (20 1b9).").
51 See David Enoch, Levi Spectre & Talia Fisher, Statistical Evidence, Sensitiv-
ity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge, 40 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 197, 211-15 (2012)
(arguing that law's primary interest is accuracy, not knowledge).
52 See HO, supra note 35, at 124-29 (discussing categorical and partial be-
liefs). But see M.T. EDVARDSSON, A NEARLY NORMAL FAMILY 10 (2019) ("I like to say
I'm a believer, not a knower."); SARAH MOSS, PROBABILISTIC KNOWLEDGE (2018) (argu-
ing that probabilistic beliefs can constitute knowledge).
53 See Franz Huber, Belief and Degrees of Belief in DEGREES OF BELIEF, supra
note 22, at 1, 1 (exploring generally the new thinking on degrees of belief, and
saying: "Degrees of belief formally represent the strength with which we believe
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produced by the evidence, that is, a belief in the contradiction
of the fact. Moreover, the factfinder can withhold part of its
belief, leaving belief uncommitted to an extent dependent on
the amount, nature, and quality of the evidence and thus caus-
ing belief and disbelief to add to less than one.
Perhaps one might be more comfortable characterizing a
degree of belief as an inclination to believe.5 4 But this sugges-
tion does not mean that the law is accepting a quasi-belief in
lieu of truth. Truth still matters. The law simply recognizes that
a multivalent degree of belief in truth is the best it can do.
Although such a belief does not require solid truth, it is still not
a New Age idea or a subjective sensation.5 5 It is neither firm
knowledge nor a squishy personal feeling. This belief is instead
the factfinder's attempt to express its degree of sureness about
the state of the real world as represented by the evidence put
the truth of various propositions. . . . For instance, Sophia's degree of belief that it
will be sunny in Vienna tomorrow might be .52, whereas her degree of belief that
the train will leave on time might be .23. The precise meaning of these statements
depends, of course, on the underlying theory of degrees of belief."); cf SUSAN
HAACK, Epistemology and the Law of Evidence: Problems and Projects, in EVIDENCE
MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND TRUTH IN THE LAW 1, 13 (2014) (describing her episte-
mology as "gradational," resulting in degrees of "warranted belief"); Eric
Schwitzgebel, Belief in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 2.4 (Edward N.
Zalta ed., 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ [https://perma.cc/
ZS29-3863] (describing degrees of belief, but failing to account for uncommitted
belief).
54 Philosophers sometimes phrase degrees of belief as credences, see Lara
Buchak, Belief Credence, and Norms, 169 PHIL. STUD. 285, 285 (2014), or as
partial beliefs, see Keith Frankish, Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief in DEGREES OF
BELIEF, supra note 22, at 75.
55 See GLENN SHAFER, A MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF EVIDENCE 20 (1976) (defining
the factfinder's belief as an act of judgment "that represents the degree to which
he judges that evidence to support a given proposition and, hence, the degree of
belief he wishes to accord the proposition"); Glenn Shafer, The Construction of
Probability Arguments, 66 B.U. L. REv. 799, 801-04 (1986) (developing a construc-
tive interpretation of probabilistic reasoning that is neither too objective nor too
personalistic). But compare DAVID CHRISTENSEN, PUTTING LOGIC IN ITS PLACE 12-13,
69 (2004) (saying that some use "belief' as an unqualified or categorical assertion
of an all-or-nothing state of belief), with L. Jonathan Cohen, Should a Jury Say
What It Believes or What It Accepts?, 13 CARDozo L. REV. 465, 479 (1991) (using
"belief," for his purposes, in the sense of a "passive feeling," and arguing that
factfinders should deal instead in acceptance), and Jordi Ferrer Beltrdn, Legal
Proof and Fact Finders' Beliefs, 12 LEGAL THEORY 293, 294 (2006) ("[Tlhe proof of p
should be explained in terms of its acceptability (and not simply of its
acceptance).").
1472
20191 STAYING FAITHFUL TO THE STANDARDS PROOF 1473
before it by a reasonable process.56 The output is a roughly
justified belief, to some degree, in truth.5 7
A degree of belief in a fact's truth of 0.40 represents proof
to 40% of full knowledge. It is not a 40% chance of the fact
being revealed as true. The latter measure would be a
probability of certain truth, assuming that there were a way to
discern the certain truth. To get the latter measure, the
factfinder would shift from a multivalent view to a bivalent
view. The shift would require the factfinder somehow to allocate
all belief between the two positions of true and false, rather
than leaving some belief uncommitted. The allocation would
require performing one of the variety of pignistic (or betting)
transforms from the credal (or belief) stage.58 The resulting
betting odds would fall somewhere in that middle range of pre-
viously uncommitted belief in the next diagram. That is, if you
wanted to get the odds for betting on a, you would have to
allocate all belief to a or not-a, while retaining no second-order
uncertainty about the allocation. The process thus might in-
voke your attitudes toward risk. You can bet with very little
information in hand, but you nevertheless must allocate all
belief between two possible outcomes, in order to place your bet
accordingly.
The choice for legal factfinding is whether to deal in
probabilities of truth or degrees of belief in truth. The choice is
one of wise policy, based on which measure will better handle
the problem at hand. Bear in mind Bertrand Russell's warning
that "the rational man, who attaches to each proposition the
56 See SusAN HAACK, Legal Probabilism- An Epistemological Dissent, in EVI-
DENCE MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND TRUTH IN THE LAw 47, 54 (2014) ("[Sitandards
of proof should be understood, not as a simple psychological matter of the degree
of jurors' belief, but as primarily an epistemological matter, the degree of belief
warranted by the evidence."); Jaffee, supra note 9, at 937 (saying that the prepon-
derance standard "is intended to assure that the factfinder will not believe an
assertion of fact without evidence adequate in logic and experience to support the
belief").
57 See Ho, supra note 35, at 89-110 (describing justified belief as the episte-
mic requirement, with truth as the measure of correctness).
58 See Barry R. Cobb & Prakash P. Shenoy, A Comparison of Methods for
Transforming Belief Function Models to Probability Models, in SYMBOLIC AND QUANTI-
TATIVE APPROACHES TO REASONING WITH UNCERTAINIY, 7TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE 255
(Tlhomas Dyhre Nielsen & Nevin Lianwen Zhang eds., 2003) (surveying several
transform methods); Haenni, supra note 22, at 129 (discussing betting probabili-
ties): Philippe Smets, Decision Making in the TBM: The Necessity of the Pignistic
Transformation, 38 INT'L J. APPROXIMATE REASONING 133 (2005) (discussing difficul-
ties of the transform); cf Nicholas J.J. Smith, Degree of Belief Is Expected Truth
Value, in CUTS AND CLOUDS: VAGUENESS, ITS NATURE, AND ITS LOGIC 491, 503-05
(Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi eds., 2010) (discussing the transform as
applied to vague concepts).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
right degree of credibility, will be guided by the mathematical
theory of probability when it is applicable. The concept 'degree
of credibility', however, is applicable much more widely than
that of mathematical probability . . . ."59
Admittedly, legal factfinding could choose to deal in
probabilities of truth. The factfinder could take an extra step
with the case's uncertainty, by allocating the uncommitted be-
lief to either true or false, although doing so while largely in the
dark. Yet, not only is there no accepted way to allocate other
than by hunch, but also this extra step would not add anything
to our knowledge of the past. Moreover, as we have already
seen, the extra step would conflict with judicial instructions
and raise many logical and practical problems.
Instead, as a descriptive and normative matter, the legal
factfinder concerns itself with degrees of belief based on the
evidence presented. The factfinder as a rational agent can,
does, and should decide with a keen awareness of how much is
unknown because of imperfect evidence. The degrees of belief
and disbelief could be below 0.50, even when added together.
The question is what to do with the leftover uncertainty. The
factfinder should decide by comparing its sureness in the fact
to its sureness in the fact's contradiction, leaving the rest of its
sureness uncommitted. It then is perfectly rational to believe a
more than not-a, and to do so without the illusion that the
probability of a's truth exceeds 50%. The factfinder can ignore
the odds for betting on unattainable truth. As we shall see,60
this approach would conform to judicial instructions and avoid
many logical and practical problems.
The law wants only the sureness measure of the
factfinder's beliefs, rendered with a sharp sense of what the
factfinder does not know. This position does not rest on anti-
probabilist prejudice. Traditional probabilities have many an-
other role to play properly in legal proof, as in the handling of
statistical evidence.6 1 Rather, this position rests on the view
59 BERTRAND RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS SCOPE AND LIMIrs 399 (1948). On
how to make the choice, see Mary A. Meyer, Kenneth B. Butterfield, William S.
Murray, Ronald E. Smith & Jane M. Booker, Guidelines for Eliciting Expert Judg-
ment as Probabilities or Fuzzy Logic, in FuzzY LOGIC AND PROBABILITY APPLICATIONS,
supra note 22, at 105 (treating the factors that sometimes make a fuzzy measure,
rather than traditional probability, the appropriate measure for the agent's
response).
60 See infra text accompanying notes 87-92 (explaining advantages relative to
probabilism).
61 See infra note 113 (discussing statistical evidence); see also Michael S.
Pardo, A Comment on Statistical Evidence and Standards of Proof 25 SUP. CT.
ECON. REv. 59 (2018) (same). For another example, in calculating the odds of
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that traditional probability's proper roles do not include mea-
suring sureness in factfinding.
Therefore, the law asks for a degree of belief in truth, not
for certain truth or the odds of certain truth. What turns on
this subtlety between degree of belief and probability of truth?
Plenty. First, the two measures invoke different vocabularies
and thoughts. Jurists tend to speak in terms of a strong-
enough belief on the part of the factfinder, while Bayesian aca-
demnics invoke traditional probabilist terminology. Second, the
two measures do differ in magnitude. Because of uncommitted
belief, the degree of belief in a fact will be smaller than the
probability of the fact.6 2 Third, as we shall also see,63 the two
measures entail different mathematics. Multivalent degrees of
belief based on imperfect evidence combine in ways very differ-
ent from how bivalent predictions of perfect knowledge
combine.
B. How Does the Factfinder Formulate Degrees of Belief?
The idea of multivalent degrees of belief received formaliza-
tion and elaboration from Rutgers Professor Glenn Shafer in
1976.6 His imposing work on "belief functions" is highly math-
ematical, but its imagery nevertheless nicely captures the ac-
tual legal-factfinding scheme.6 5 Indeed, the imagery represents
how evaluation of processed evidence should proceed in light of
future events, as in computing expected costs on a motion for a preliminary
injunction, the product rule would be appropriate. See CLERMONT, supra note 4, at
176-77 (discussing appropriate roles for probabilism in evidence); Ho, supra note
35, at 118-21 (same).
62 See Clermont, Common Sense, supra note 23, at 1067 (showing this result
for the pignistic transform from a belief).
63 See infra text accompanying notes 104-121 (explaining MIN and MAX
rules).
64 SHAFER, supra note 55 (using "evidence" in a much broader sense than legal
evidence), reviewed by Lotfi A. Zadeh, AI MAG., Fall 1984, at 81, 83 (treating
Shafer's theory as a version of fuzzy logic's possibility theory); see Glenn Shafer,
Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Belief Functions, 4 INT'L J. APPROXIMATE
REASONING 323 (1990) (summarizing, simplifying, and updating his theory). For
the historical background of the theory, see Haenni, supra note 22, at 127-33.
65 For a defense of using a broad view of belief function theory as imagery, see
Liping Liu & Ronald R. Yager, Classic Works of the Dempster-Shafer Theory of
Belief Functions: An Introduction, in CLASSIC WORKS OF THE DEMPSTER-SHAFER THE-
ORY OF BELIEF FUNcTIONS 1, 2-12 (Ronald R. Yager & Liping Liu eds., 2008) (formal-
izing an image of belief functions); cf. Vil6m Novdk, Modeling with Words,
SCHOLARPEDIA (2008), http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Modelingivth-words
[http://perma.cc/2JWT-YLZ8] ("Mathematical fuzzy logic has two branches: fuzzy
logic in narrow sense (FLn) and fuzzy logic in broader sense (FLb). FLn is a formal
fuzzy logic which is a special many-valued logic generalizing classical mathemati-
cal logic.. . . FLb is an extension of FLn which aims at developing a formal theory
of human reasoning.").
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:1457
theory and human capabilities, but also fairly well how human
factfinders do act and how the law does tell them to act in
evaluating the processed evidence.66
An initial step backwards might be helpful, so let me say a
few more words on bivalent logic versus multivalent logic.
Many different systems of logic exist, useful in different set-
tings. Because of the classical logic system's dominance, we
tend to forget that it rests on the critical assumption of biva-
lence: every proposition must either be true or be false, taking a
value of 1 or 0. The traditional probability theory built on class-
ical logic rests on the same assumption: probability represents
the random uncertainty that the proposition is actually true or
false, one or the other. The bivalence assumption pays off in
that classical logic turns out to be very useful. But like Euclid-
ean geometry and Newtonian physics, classical logic and tradi-
tional probability constitute a very useful oversimplification
66 For my purposes, it is important that belief function theory is basically
consistent with fuzzy logic, as well as with fuzzy logic's progeny called possibility
theory. See Didier Dubois & Henri Prade, A Set-Theoretic View of Belief Functions:
Logical Operations and Approximations by Fuzzy Sets, in CLASSIc WORKS OF THE
DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS, supra note 65, at 375, 403 (linking
belief functions and fuzzy sets); Huber, supra note 53, at 10-15 (linking belief
functions and possibility theory); Dale A. Nance, Formalism and Potential Sur-
prise: Theorizing About Standards of Proof 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1017, 1036-37
(2018) (using possibility theory to untangle the conjunction paradox); Shapira,
supra note 22, at 1614 ("In the legally relevant literature, it was Professor Glenn
Shafer who introduced fuzzy measures as appropriate formalizations of epistemic
functions."); L.A. Zadeh, Fuzzy Sets as a Basis for a Theory of Possibility, 1 FuzzY
SETS & SYS. 3, 3 (1978) (deriving possibility theory from fuzzy sets); cf. DAVID A.
SCHUM, THE EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC REASONING 266-69 (1994) (ob-
serving that one can fuzzify belief functions); John Yen, Generalizing the Demp-
ster-Shafer Theory to Fuzzy Sets, in CLASSIC WORKS OF THE DEMPSTER-SHAFER
THEORY OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS, supra note 65, at 529 (showing how to form beliefs
about membership in fuzzy sets). In fact, belief functions and fuzzy logic are also
compatible with the pathbreaking work done on Baconian probability by COHEN,
supra note 45, at 121 (terming his approach "inductive probability," but using
imagery that is difficult to grasp). See CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 180-81 (bridging
to Cohen's work). All three approaches are nonadditive and reject the product
rule, end up equivalent in their essential lessons, and stand together in opposi-
tion to traditional probability. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 250-61
(sketching intelligently the three approaches in contrast to traditional
probability); SCHUM, supra, at 200-66 (same in greater detail). Other multivalent
approaches end in similar places and reject traditional probability. See, e.g., Amos
Tversky & Derek J. Koehler, Support Theory: A Nonextensional Representation of
Subjective Probability, 101 PSYCH. REV. 547, 547 (1994) ("In contrast to the Baye-
sian school, which represents degree of belief by an additive probability measure,
there are many skeptics who question the possibility and the wisdom of quanti-
fying subjective uncertainty and are reluctant to apply the laws of chance to the
analysis of belief."); infra note 162 (discussing ranking theory). Of all the available
candidates, I have selected belief functions and fuzzy logic as the multivalent-
logical systems whose imagery best reflects and illuminates legal factfinding.
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that gives wrong answers around the edges of their
assumptions.67
The cure lies in deploying a more general logic system.
Multivalent logic does not assume bivalence. It allows a pro-
position to be perceived as true to a degree, taking some value
between 1 and 0. Bivalent logic is a special case of multivalent
logic, used when values can only be 1 or 0. The easiest exam-
ples of the usefulness of multivalent logic come from vague
terms like "tall."68 In a bivalent world, a person is either tall or
not. With multivalence, we can describe a person as exhibiting
a degree of tallness. But multivalent logic is in no way limited to
vagueness.69 It can handle any sort of variable, from vague
concepts all the way to belief in the truth of a past fact. Such
past facts otherwise look to be either/or and subject only to
random uncertainty. Yet they actually appear to the investiga-
tor not as true or false, but instead as something falling be-
tween completely true and completely false. In other words,
even for a past event, one can express a' multivalent belief in
truth, just as one can vaguely express tallness.
This situation counsels the use of multivalent logic in legal
factfinding. Just as the investigator can express a degree of
belief in the fact, all views of triable facts should be expressed
as multivalent degrees of belief. The triable fact is not suscepti-
ble to being viewed as certainly, or even almost certainly, true
or false. There would be no trial of the fact otherwise. Moreover,
the factual disputes are "unsettlable," in that there will be no
revelation of truth.70 In short, handling found facts is different
from placing bets or flipping coins.
Coming back now to belief function theory, after the
factfinder processes the evidence, a belief in a fact called a can
range anywhere between 0 and 1. Likewise, belief in not-a,
which is disbelief of a or, equivalently, an active belief in ds
contradiction, falls between 0 and 1. The probative force of the
67 By the way, Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics, both based on
classical logic, break down in the face of general relativity and quantum mechan-
ics, which take down classical logic's bivalence assumption. See MICHAEL DUM-
METr, Is Logic Empirical?, in TRUTH AND OTHER ENIGMAs 269 (1978).
68 See Roy Sorensen, Vagueness, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vagueness/
[https://perma.cc/J4M6-343Y) ("[A] term is vague to the extent that it has bor-
derline cases.").
69 See Radim BelohlAvek, George J. Klir, Harold W. Lewis III & Eileen Way, On
the Capability ofFuzzy Set Theory to Represent Concepts, 31 INT'L J. GEN. SYs. 569,
575 (2002) (stressing the reach of fuzzy logic).
70 COHEN, supra note 45, at 91 (arguing that the law's interest lies in provabil-
ity, not probability).
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parties' presentations, as well as avoidable defects in evi-
dence,7 1 will affect the degree of belief in a and in not-a. Also,
on the basis of incomplete, inconclusive, ambiguous, or disso-
nant evidence, some of the factfinder's belief should remain
undetermined. Thus, in factfinding, we ask how much we be-
lieve a to be a real-world truth based on the evidence, as well as
how much we believe not-a, while remaining conscious of un-
certainty and so recognizing that part of our belief will remain
uncommitted as a nonbelief.7 2 In other words, a belief and the




To illustrate, let a, say, that Katie is dead, be an element of
a claim. The zone between Bel(a) and Bel(not-a) represents the
uncommitted belief. Indeed, any case starts with the whole
range of belief standing as uncommitted. The proper represen-
tation of lack of proof is zero belief in the plaintiffs position-
but also zero belief in the defendant's position. As the plaintiff
introduces proof, some of the factfinder's uncommitted belief
should start to convert into a degree of belief in ds existence,
and almost inevitably the plaintiffs proof will also have the
inadvertent effect of generating an active belief in at least the
slightest possibility of its nonexistence, namely, that Katie is
alive. If the defendant next introduces effective proof to reduce
the belief in a, whether the proof comes in the form of negation
or as part of an alternative and inconsistent account, the de-
gree of active belief in a's nonexistence would presumably
grow. Or the very clash of beliefs could diminish the degrees of
belief in both a and not-a.
71 See Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, 33 VT. L. REV. 469,
480-81 (2009) ("[Tihe common-law fact-finder is not supposed to hold an unavoid-
able paucity of evidence against the burdened party, but is instead in such a
situation supposed to decide the likelihood based on the evidence." (emphasis
added)).
72 See Liu & Yager, supra note 65, at 3-4 (describing uncommitted belief);
Hans Rott, Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs, in
DEGREES OF BELIEF, supra note 22, at 301, 302 (calling uncommitted belief a
nonbelief); Rajendra P. Srivastava & Glenn R. Shafer, Belief-Function Formulas for
Audit Risk, in CLAssic WORKs OF THE DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS,
supra note 65, at 577, 581 ("Belief functions. . . permit uncommitted belief.. . .").
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When we say after evidence processing that Bel(a) = 0.40,
we are not saying that Bel(not-a) = 0.60. We are saying only that
the proof is such that to a degree of 0.60, which could represent
uncommitted belief in part or in whole, a has not been proven
to be true. Imperfect evidence means that some of the belief will
remain uncommitted, with the remaining belief divided be-
tween Bel(a) and Bel(not-a). So, the belief in a's falsity would be
smaller than 0.60. In the diagram, Bel(not-a) = 0.20. It does not
equal 1-Bel(a), a measure that expresses only the maximal
"possibility" of not-a. Hence, there is a big difference between
the complement and the belief in the contradiction, the differ-
ence being the uncommitted belief. After all, a lack of belief and
a disbelief are entirely different states of mind.
Parenthetically, amidst all these decimals, bear in mind
that one need not quantify beliefs in order to work with them,
and indeed usually one should not. Because all the factfinder
usually needs to do is compare the strengths of belief and
disbelief, the factfinder need almost never place the fact on a
quantified scale of likelihood.
Even if one desired to quantify a particular proposition,
one should express a belief as its degree of membership in the
set of fully believed facts. Then, given humans' limited ability to
evaluate likelihood, one should express the belief in words
drawn from a coarsely gradated scale of likelihood, rather than
speaking in misrepresentative terms of decimals. The following
diagram gives an appropriately gradated scale that utilizes nat-
ural language and captures the fuzzy imprecision of beliefs,
whether the burden of persuasion is on plaintiff or defendant:
(1) slightest possibility, (2) reasonable possibility, (3) substan-
tial possibility, (4) equipoise, (5) probability, (6) high
probability, and (7) almost certainty.73
This rough scale works both for beliefs and for probabili-
ties, although, as I have explained, the degree of belief in a fact
will be smaller than the probability of the fact, because of un-
committed belief. This scale shows why, when the factfinder
finds Bel(a) > Bel(not-a), it is not drawing a fine line or making a
close call, but rather saying that the degree of belief is at least a
whole step upward in likelihood from its degree of disbelief.
73 See CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 35-36, 166-68 (extricating law's coarsely
gradated scale of likelihood).
O ----- -------------------------------------------------------- ) 1
Slightest Reasonable Substantial Equipoise Probability High Near
Possibility Possibility Possibility Probability Certainty
Near High Probability Equipoise Substantial Reasonable Slightest
Certainty Probability Possibility Possibility Possibility
1 4---- -------------------------------------------------------------
C. How Does the Factfinder Apply the Standards of Proof?
In evaluating the evidence, the factfinder must apply the
standard of proof. The standard seems to require some sort of
comparison of beliefs, nonbeliefs, and disbeliefs.74 A variety of
comparisons is conceivable, involving either sizes or ratios.75
But a civil case's preponderance standard seems to ask
whether the factfinder believes the fact is true more than the
factfinder believes that the fact is false.76 That is, the factfinder
should ask the natural question that the law seems to pose by
"more likely than not": do you believe the burdened party's
allegation more than you disbelieve it?7 7
More specifically, this believed-more-than-disbelieved
standard calls for constructing separate beliefs for a and not-a
while leaving some belief uncommitted, and then comparing
the sizes of the beliefs in a's truth and falsity while ignoring the
uncommitted belief. A preponderance of the evidence then
means that Bel(a) > Bel(not-a), not that Bel(a) > 0.50. Indeed,
finding an element to exist will sometimes entail a smallish
belief found to exceed an even smaller belief in its contradic-
74 See Thomas M. Strat, Decision Analysis Using Belief Functions, 4 INT'L J.
APPROXIMATE REASONING 391, 391-92 (1990) (recognizing the need for some type of
transform to proceed from beliefs to decisions).
75 See Dale A. Nance, Belief Functions and Burdens of Proof: Competing
Views 6-8, 15-16, 25-26 (June 28, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (sketching various comparison possibilities).
76 See Nissho-Iwai Co. v. M/T Stolt Lion, 719 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The
term 'preponderance' means that 'upon all the evidence ... the facts asserted by
the plaintiff are more probably true than false.'" (quoting Porter v. Am. Exp. Lines,
Inc., 387 F.2d 409, 411 (3d Cir. 1968))).
77 See Clermont, Belief Function, supra note 9, at 373-75 (explicating the
preponderance standard); J.P. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief 32
CALIF. L. REv. 242, 248-49 (1944) (examining what level of proof a factfinder needs
in order to believe in the burdened party's position).
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tion.7 To continue my example, the factfinder should find a
even if Bel(a) = 0.40, when Bel(not-a) appears as 0.20 and the
uncommitted belief equals 0.40.
Besides preponderance, American law employs the two
standards of clear and convincing evidence and beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. These less simple standards need separate ex-
planation, even though my general discussion could focus on
preponderance until here. When the cost of a false positive in
factfinding considerably exceeds the cost of a false negative,
the law tries to minimize error costs by raising the standard of
proof. In doing so, it considers not just the costs of erroneous
decisions ex post but also the benefits of correct decisions in
setting ex ante incentives.7 9 Here is not the place to reconsider
the law's complicated and contentious calculations. On these
higher standards, I shall therefore shift from a descriptive and
normative approach to trying just to explain in terms of beliefs
what the law has decided to do on the basis of policy.
Clear and convincing evidence appears under current law
to require that Bel(a) >> Bel(not-a). This standard is easy to
apply because we are used to the idea of being clearly con-
vinced of something, in life and in law.8 0 It means that rela-
78 Factfinders disregard the uncommitted belief even when the proof of both
the fact's existence and its nonexistence is weak. See Clermont, Belief Function,
supra note 9, at 356, 374, 381-82 (discussing weak-proof cases). If the plaintiff
has carried the burden of production and if the plaintiffs proof is perceptibly
stronger than the defendant's after taking into account any failure to produce
evidence, decision must go for the plaintiff. The court cannot choose not to decide,
and a decision for the plaintiff is less likely an error than decision for the defen-
dant would be. See Larry Laudan, Strange Bedfellows: Inference to the Best Expla-
nation and the Criminal Standard of Proof 11 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 292,
304-05 (2007) ("The trier of fact cannot say, 'Although plaintiffs case is stronger
than defendant's, I will reach no verdict since neither party has a frightfully good
story to tell.' Under current rules, if the plaintiff has a better story than the
defendant, he must win the suit, even when his theory of the case fails to satisfy
the strictures required to qualify his theory as the best explanation.").
79 See HIIARY EVANS CAMERON, REFUGEE LAw's FAcT-FINDING CRISIS: TRUTH, RISK,
AND THE WRONG MISTAKE (2018) (applying the factors sensitively in a particular
context); CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 25-31 (treating the setting of standards as a
policy judgment).
80 See Clermont, Belief Function, supra note 9, at 375-76 (explicating the
clear-and-convincing standard). A promising alternative that employs a ratio of
Bel(a) and Bel(not-a) appears in Nance, supra note 75, at 15-16. My formulation of
a higher standard is similar, but not equivalent, to Nance's elevated ratio. Al-
though stating the clear-and-convincing standard as, say, Bel(a) > 2*Bel(not-a)
might have some theoretical advantages, the current law does not employ such a
standard. That is, although theorists have long spoken of ratios, the law has
always resisted their vision. Speaking in terms of ratios does not accord with
accepted legal language and sense. See CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 30-31 (ex-
plaining ratio approach in criminal context). Actually speaking of ratios would
necessitate a major shift, and a lot more detail, in the current judicial instruction.
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tively close calls go against the proponent. If one wanted a more
explicit formulation, one could say that the factfinder needs to
be more convinced than merely believing that the likelihood of
a exceeds the likelihood of not-a on the above-diagramed scale
of seven gross categories of likelihood, and instead the
factfinder needs to believe that it is at least two categories
higher.
It is possible that this intermediate standard of proof could
be more demanding, as by imposing a requirement of complete-
ness of evidence. That is, current law could demand that the
admitted evidence reduce uncommitted belief below some
stated standard. But I nondogmatically doubt it demands this
extra. The clear-and-convincing cases are not explicit, but they
do seem to speak in terms of the necessary degree of belief
being stronger than what preponderance requires, and not in
terms of a standard of proof that differs in kind, as by also
demanding complete evidence.8 1
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, does under
current law seem different in kind as to demandingness.2 It
must require more than Bel(a) >> Bel(not-a). It might merely
require Bel(a) >>> Bel(not-a), as the probabilists would have it.
But more realistically and effectively, current law appears to
The explanation would lead to quantification of beliefs and maybe to talk of
probabilities. But perhaps the real reason for the law's approach is that a required
ratio could not be communicated to, or understood by, factfinders without a
terrific risk of wild mistake on their part. Cf. id. at 15-16 (recounting the law's
rejection of variable standards of proof, even though they might be theoretically
desirable).
81 See Tauese v. State, Dep't of Labor & Indus. Relations, 147 P.3d 785,
819-20 (Haw. 2006) ("Under Hawai'i law, 'clear and convincing' evidence is 'de-
fined as an intermediate standard of proof greater than a preponderance of the
evidence, but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt required in criminal
cases.' This standard requires 'that degree of proof which will produce in the mind
of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be
established, and requires the existence of a fact be highly probable.'" (citations
omitted) (quoting Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 574-75 (Haw. 1989)
(observing also, "The law has evolved three standards of levels of proof for different
types of cases."))); Molyneux v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 35 P.2d 651, 655-56 (Idaho
1934) (saying that "clear, positive, and unequivocal" overstates the clear-and-
convincing standard); CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 23-25, 73-82 (giving back-
ground on the clear-and-convincing standard, and arguing that there are and
should be only three standards of proof); 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note
11, § 340 (citing cases on the clear-and-convincing standard). But see Hillary
Gaston Walsh, Unequivocally Different: The Third Civil Standard of Proof 66 U.
KAN. L. REV. 565, 602 (2018) (arguing for a fourth standard of "clear, unequivocal,
and convincing" evidence applicable in immigration cases, which would be higher
than clear and convincing).
82 See CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 26-31 (giving background on the criminal
standard).
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place separate demands on Bel(a) and Bel(not-a), demanding
that proof of guilt be strong and that no reasonable doubt
persists. Those separate demands of a sizable Bel(a) and a tiny
Bel(not-a) will ensure that Bel(a) >>> Bel(not-a), but require
more.
Although there are many conceivable approaches to the
extra requirement, my conjectured formulation of the current
law would require both (i) that the belief in guilt (Bel(a)) be
strong enough to exceed the so-called maximal possibility of
innocence (1-Bel(a)), and (ii) that no reasonable possibility of
innocence exist, that is, that the factfinder could not reasona-
bly hold that Bel(not-a) exceeds the lowest category of slightest
likelihood on the scale of seven gross categories of likelihood.8 3
The first requirement of strong proof of guilt ensures that
the belief in guilt outweighs all alternative possibilities, includ-
ing fanciful ones. Bel(a) cannot be weak, compared to the maxi-
mal possibility of innocence. This part of the standard thus
remains comparative. Asking for a belief that guilt is more
likely than all alternative possibilities is fairly communicable to
and understandable by the factfinder. Moreover, the proof of
guilt must be solid enough that the factfinder is not swimming
in uncommitted belief. We do not want to convict when, al-
though there is some evidence of guilt, we really do not know
what happened. The first requirement thus requires a com-
pleteness of evidence not required on the civil side.84
The second requirement expresses the accepted idea im-
plicit in the criminal standard that the factfinder cannot retain
a reasonable belief in innocence or, equivalently, a reasonable
83 See Clermont, Belief Function, supra note 9, at 376-77 (explicating the
criminal standard).
84 Also, the first requirement might mollify those who treat the criminal stan-
dard as a unitary but very high probability standard and then argue that the
standard is much too demanding to be optimal. E.g., Ronald J. Allen & Larry
Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 65, 68 (2008) ("While the pros-
pect of convicting or executing a truly innocent person is horrifying, this type of
mistake occurs within a highly complicated matrix of relationships where other
equally horrifying mistakes go unnoticed in the conventional discourse."); cf Fe-
derico Picinali, Can the Reasonable Doubt Standard Be Justified?: A Reconstructed
Dialogue, 31 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 365 (2018) (reconciling deontologists' and
consequentialists' views). Still, given the usual limits on available evidence,
achieving such a high degree of belief that Bel(a) > 1 -Bel(a) constitutes a demand-
ing standard. Bear in mind that a Bel(a) in excess of 1-Bel(a), along with a tiny
Bel(not-a), would usually convert by pignistic transform into a very high
probability, not far from the probabilities often mentioned in association with
beyond a reasonable doubt. See CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 108-11 (surveying
empirical studies); Lawrence T. White & Michael D. Cicchini, Is Reasonable Doubt
Self-Defining?, 64 VILL. L. REv. 1 (2019) (describing study that suggested 65 per-
cent threshold).
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doubt as to guilt.8 5 The second requirement works to satisfy
those who contend that the criminal standard "is intended to
make even the juror who thinks that the defendant 'did it,' in
everyday terms, think twice."86 The second requirement ex-
plains why some infamous, celebrity defendants who were "ob-
viously guilty" were nevertheless properly acquitted.
D. How Can the Multivalent-Belief Model Solve
Probability's Difficulties?
One sign that the law should, and actually does, embrace
the multivalent-belief model is that this model resolves all
those paradoxes, puzzles, and problems that plague the proba-
bilistic position:
1. Unrealistic factfinding. Probabilistic thinking, with its
usual p > 50% formulation of preponderance, induces
one to speak in quantified terms. Expressing the stan-
dard instead as Bel(a) > Bel(not-a) avoids the troublesome
task of quantification. Additionally, comparing those two
beliefs invokes the factfinders' considerable powers of rel-
ative judgment, rather than humans' weak powers of ab-
solute judgment required for placement on some scale of
likelihood.87
2. Prior probability. A huge difficulty for traditional
probability theory is fixing the starting point for factfind-
ing: many a probabilist is left to assume that when the
factfinder knows nothing, the rational starting point is
50%. Under the multivalent-belief model, however, the
well-behaved factfinder starts not at 50% but at zero be-
lief. Then, to get Bel(a) to exceed Bel(not-a), the proponent
must generate a reasonable possibility, the first degree of
belief perceptibly above the zero level of disbelief. This
requirement conforms to the law's dictate that to get past
the gatekeeper-judge and reach the factfinder requires
more than a feather's weight of evidence. Moreover, the
multivalent-belief standard of proof conforms to the law
by saying that the nonburdened party does not need to
develop a competing version of the truth, but can suc-
ceed as long as the proponent's case remains relatively
weak. These insights make sense of the notion of a bur-
85 See CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 36-38 (explaining the meaning of
equivalent standards when the burden shifts).
86 Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and
Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 199
(1969); see Pardo, supra note 38, at 1829 & n. 142 (seeing the beyond-a-reasona-
ble-doubt standard as imposing a double requirement).
87 See CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 62-66 (discussing human limitations on
nonrelative judgment).
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den of production. That burden is not some additional
requirement arbitrarily introduced to supplement my
model, but instead flows naturally from requiring that a
reasonable factfinder could find that Bel(a) perceptibly
exceeds Bel(not-a).8 8
3. Infinite alternatives. Under the traditional probability
model, the infinite range of possibilities alternative to the
proponent's allegations appears to make the burden of
persuasion very heavy. By contrast, the multivalent-be-
lief model clarifies that the proponent need not dispel all
possible alternatives. The model does not require the
completeness of proof that would be necessary for the
burdened party to get belief to some level above 50%, but
instead is willing to follow the law by resting decisions on
the evidence presented. Furthermore, the burdened
party need not fight imaginary fights, trying to disprove
every alternative possibility, but instead can focus on
elevating a and depressing not-a. All those possible states
of the world that create neither a belief in a nor a belief in
not-a remain in the uncommitted belief.8 9
4. Element-by-element factfinding. Speaking in terms of
probability brings into play the product rule, which says
that the probability of a conjunction of independent ele-
ments is the product of their probabilities and thus leads
to the aforementioned paradox: it seems that each ele-
ment's being more likely than not is no guarantee that
the elements' conjunction will be more likely than not.
But the mathematics of traditional probability is not ap-
plicable to combining beliefs. The highly developed and
widely accepted mathematics for combining beliefs in-
stead instructs that the conjunction has a degree of belief
equal to the weakest of the conjoined beliefs, in accor-
dance with the so-called MIN rule. The paradox, as well
as the criticality of the size of elements, vaporizes: if each
element is more likely than not, then the elements' con-
junction must be more likely than not.90
88 See Clermont, Belief Function, supra note 9, at 377-82 (explicating the
burden of production).
89 See id. at 369-77 (explicating the burden of persuasion).
90 Philosophers and logicians agree with the law's approach. See COHEN,
supra note 45, at 89-91, 265-67 (arguing that the conjunction of two or more
propositions has the same inductive probability as the least likely conjunct);
RUSSELL, supra note 59, at 359-61 (arguing comparably that his "degrees of credi-
bility" do not follow the product rule of traditional probability); Dubois & Prade,
supra note 66, at 403 (rejecting the application of "arguments deriving from the
study of statistical experiments"); Susan Haack, The Embedded Epistemologist:
Dispatches from the Legal Front, 25 RATIO JURiS 206, 217-18 (2012) (arguing
comparably that her "degrees of warrant" do not follow the product rule of tradi-
tional probability); John MacFarlane, Fuzzy Epistemicism, in CUTS AND CLOUDS,
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5. Standards' purposes. Most importantly, traditional
probability does not deliver the message that standards
of proof should convey. The law is looking for some sort of
conviction on the part of its factfinders, not a probability.
The multivalent-belief model not only better communi-
cates the standards' message, but also better serves the
law's other purposes.9 1 For example, the reformulated
preponderance standard achieves the goal of minimizing
error costs in civil cases. The mathematics of beliefs, by
the so-called MAX rule, instructs that a disjunction has a
degree of belief equal to the strongest of the disjoined
beliefs. It further instructs that if each belief is stronger
than its disbelief, the conjunction of the beliefs is
stronger than the disjunction of disbeliefs, that is, the
conjoined story is stronger than all other possible stories
combined.92
Let me expand on the last two points. We can better under-
stand them if we follow the law's lead in using a different im-
agery for verbalizing and combining beliefs, once the beliefs are
formulated and evaluated. Law and lawyers tend at this point
to shift unconsciously from a style of thinking that conforms
with belief functions (used by factfinders when applying the
standard of proof, with acute awareness of uncommitted belief)
to a form of speech that conforms with fuzzy logic (used by
lawyers, when discussing the output of evidence evaluation
after disregarding the uncommitted belief, as "more probable
than not" or whatever).9 3 Fortunately, belief functions and
fuzzy logic are compatible, being alternative representations of
multivalence.9 4 This switch in imagery is not necessary, but
supra note 58, at 438 (arguing against the product rule and in favor of the MIN
rule).
91 See Edward K. Cheng & Michael S. Pardo, Accuracy, Optimality and the
Preponderance Standard, 14 LAw, PROBABILITY & RISK 193 (2015) (considering vari-
ous purposes, but prioritizing accuracy).
92 See Clermont, Fuzzy Logic, supra note 16, at 64-66 (making the efficiency
argument). On the normalization step implied here, see infra text accompanying
notes 94-107.
93 See HAACK, supra note 56, at 57 (illustrating the legal system's usages).
94 For a mathematical defense of a switch from belief functions to fuzzy logic,
and for the simplifying assumptions on which the switch rests, see Didier Dubois
& Henri Prade, Consonant Approximations of Belief Functions, 4 INT'L J. APPROXI-
MATE REASONING 419, 419 (1990) ("Viewing a fuzzy set as a consonant random set,
it is shown how to construct fuzzy sets that may act as approximations of belief
functions."); Rott, supra note 72, at 304, 311 (assuming that if b is less likely than
a, then not-a should be less likely than not-b). The law apparently makes those
simplifying assumptions in the pursuit of simple rules' workability.
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the switch both conforms to the law's imagery and makes it
simpler and easier to picture and discuss what is going on.9 5
Now let me explain the new imagery. Fuzzy logic derives
from the brilliant pioneering work of Berkeley Professor Lotfi
Zadeh dating from 1965.96 Fuzzy logic measures a multivalued
variable, or a degree of membership in, some fuzzy set.9 7 The
degree may take any value throughout the interval [0,1], rather
than just the value of 0 or 1 as in classical logic. So, think of the
set of facts fully believed to be true, where membership mea-
sures the degree of believed truth of a statement of fact. Be-
cause the statement can be believed as true to some degree, we
call the degree a fuzzy belief.98
Both fuzzy logic and belief functions employ MIN and MAX
rules.9 9 These operators apply in most multivalent systems
(such as fuzzy logic and belief functions), while some variation
of the product rule governs in most bivalent systems (such as
frequentist events and betting odds with fully committed be-
lief).100 Fuzzy beliefs differ from belief functions in their treat-
95 See MIRCEA REGHIS & EUGENE ROVENTA, CLASSICAL AND FUZZY CONCEPTS IN
MATHEMATICAL LOGIC AND APPLICATIONS 354 (1998) (referencing belief functions and
fuzzy logic, and observing: "In order to treat different aspects of the same
problems, we must therefore apply various theories related to the imprecision of
knowledge."); SCHUM, supra note 66, at 41, 200-01 (disbelieving that it is "possible
to capture all of this behavioral richness within the confines of any single formal
system of probabilities").
96 L.A. Zadeh, Fuzzy Sets, 8 INFO. & CONTROL 338 (1965). See generally BART
KOSKO, FUZZY THINKING: THE NEW SCIENCE OF FuzzY LOGIC (1993) (giving a popular-
ized view of fuzzy logic); Petr Cintula, Christian G. Fermiller & Carles Noguera,
Fuzzy Logic, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2017),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-fuzzy/ [https://perma.cc/5DSZ-
XDBUJ. For the historical background of the theory, see Didier Dubois, Francesc
Esteva, Lluis Godo & Henri Prade, Fuzzy-Set Based Logics-An History-Oriented
Presentation of Their Main Developments, in 8 HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF LOGIC
325, 432 (2007).
97 Fuzzy set theory is a common, but not necessary, way to represent and
work with fuzzy logic. See THEODORE SIDER, LOGIC FOR PHILOSOPHY 12-23 (2010)
(introducing set theory); Ross & Parkinson, supra note 22, at 33 (linking fuzzy
logic and fuzzy set theory).
98 I am treating beliefs in truth as fuzzy, for purposes of decisionmaking. I do
not view truth itself as fuzzy for pure facts. A lively debate exists as to whether I
could do so, with some contemplating the existence of such vagueness. See Gar-
eth Evans, Can There Be Vague Objects?, 38 ANALYSIS 208 (1978); Michael Mor-
reau, What Vague Objects Are Like, 99 J. PHIL. 333, 334-35 (2002); Sorensen,
supra note 68, § 8. In any event, I am not treating factual truth itself as fuzzy, and
I do not need to do so for present purposes.
99 See Clermont, Belief Function, supra note 9, at 385-89 (applying MIN and
MAX rules to belief functions).
100 The product rule derives from the givens of traditional probability, which
are the bivalence assumption and Kolmogorov's three axioms, and so it is inopera-
tive when those conditions do not hold. See Brian R. Gaines, Fuzzy and
Probability Uncertainty Logics, 38 INFO. & CONTROL 154, 157 (1978) ("[Bloth multi-
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ment of uncertainty, however. Belief functions treat all
uncertainty front and center in terms of uncommitted belief,
while fuzzy set theory moves any second-order uncertainty,
that is, uncertainty about the estimate of degree of member-
ship, into the additional dimension of a so-called ultra-fuzzy
set. It is fuzzy logic's separation of first-order imprecision from
second-order uncertainty that makes the operation of its MIN
rule simpler and easier. 101
Fuzzy imagery allows us to speak of beliefs in terms of a
likelihood that a fact is true and a complementary likelihood
that it is not proven. 102 To get there, we recognize the disregard
of uncommitted belief, in application of the standard of proof,
by normalizing the belief functions Bel(a) and Bel(not-a). That
is, we scale them up proportionately so that together they equal
1, thereby moving the uncommitted belief back into another
dimension. The degrees of beliefs then appear as normalized
fuzzy beliefs. Normalizing Bel(a) = 0.40 and Bel(not-a) = 0.20
would yield a fuzzy belief in a equal to 0.67, and a fuzzy belief in
ds not being proven equal to 0.33. Although these numbers
look like odds, they are not odds. They retain the relative rela-
tion of Bel(a) and Bel(not-a), but 0.67 is just the best first-order
estimate of the provability of a. To get odds, one would instead
have to perform a pignistic transform by consciously allocating
all belief between true and false, thereby eliminating all partial
truths. 103
plication/addition, and max/min, connectives may be seen to arise from con-
straints on an underlying probability logic."). The product rule does not apply in
systems that reject the law of the excluded middle. See id. at 155-59, 161 (show-
ing that the MIN rule of fuzzy logic reduces to the product rule for independent
events in a bivalent world, but that only the MIN rule applies in a fuzzy world). In
sum, the law of the excluded middle dictates additivity, which dictates the proper
conjunction operator. See supra notes 20-22 (discussing excluded middle and
additivity).
101 See Clermont, Common Sense, supra note 23, at 1065, 1075-76 (explain-
ing how the different treatments of uncertainty counsel the switch in images).
102 See CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 187 (showing that fuzzy logic remains
nonadditive); Clermont, Fuzzy Logic, supra note 16, at 60-64 (showing how com-
plementarity is not contradiction in fuzzy logic); Ross & Parkinson, supra note 22,
at 33 (same).
103 Many readers get confused here. They view probabilities of truth and beliefs
in truth as fundamentally equivalent concepts, both being multivalent measures
on a range from 0 to 1. But the two concepts are built on different logics. Tradi-
tional probability represents the random uncertainty that a proposition is actually
true or false and so rests on classical logic, with its excluded middle and its
additivity consequence. Beliefs in truth, as discussed herein, employ multivalent
logic (such as belief functions or fuzzy logic), which does not assume an excluded
middle and hence does not exhibit additivity. The law's choice between logics
turns on whether factfinding should focus on bivalent truths that come only as 0
or 1 or on multivalent beliefs that can take on all values from no belief to full
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FlzzyBet(a) FuzziyBel(not-a)
0 1
Once this far in fuzzy imagery, we can utilize the well-
established logical operators of fuzzy logic. Its conjunction op-
erator, a more general replacement for the product rule, is the
so-called MIN rule for combining fuzzy beliefs in proposition a
and proposition b:
FuzzyBel(a AND b) = minimun(FuzzyBe(a), FuzzyBel(b))
If after proof FuzzyBel(a) is 0.67 and FuzzyBel(b) is 0.60, then
by fuzzy logic their conjunction is 0.60.104
On the one hand, the probabilistic odds of a dictate under
bivalence the odds of not-a, and so the conjunction of a and b
means mounting odds of not-a or not-b. 105 That is, the comple-
ment of the probabilistic chance of ds being revealed as true is
the chance of a's being revealed as false. The chance of a's
being revealed as false interacts with the chance of b's being
revealed as false, so that the chance of a or b being revealed as
false goes up, and the chance of a and b being true goes down,
by a multiplicative amount in accordance with the product
rule.
On the other hand, under multivalent logic, if one believes
a and one believes b, then by the principle of conjunctive clo-
sure one believes a and b together, although of course not more
than one believes a or b separately.106 A belief is an evidence-
based measure of sureness about the real world. The comple-
belief. What this whole article is about, then, is which is a more realistic and
effective representation of a found fact: either additive odds of bivalent truth or
partial belief and disbelief that do not add to one? The law's choice between logics
thus means choosing between different variables, either bivalent truths or multi-
valent beliefs. I think a focus on bivalent truth would produce all sorts of logical
and practical problems; and I observe that existing law in many respects, such as
its element-by-element factfinding, already rejects a focus on bivalent truth.
104 Much of my prior writing on standards of proof treated this conjunction
operator in detail, as well as the MAX operator for fuzzy disjunction. I am trying to
be nontechnical in this Article, so here I shall only cite ALIEv, supra note 22, at 1, 6
(stating formally the MIN operator); Richard Bellman & Magnus Giertz, On the
Analytic Formalism of the Theory of Fuzzy Sets, 5 INFO. SC. 149, 151-52 (1973)
(defending the MIN rule for use in conjoining the truth values of multiple proposi-
tions); Ronald R. Yager, Connectives and Quantifiers in Fuzzy Sets, 40 FuZZY SETS
& SYS. 39 (1991) (giving a more technically complete defense).
105 See CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 173, 194 (explaining the product rule for
bivalent systems).
106 See Simon J. Evnine, Believing Conjunctions, 118 SYNTHESE 201, 201, 214,
222 (1999) (stating the principle as "[ihf S is rational, then if S believes A and S
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ment of a belief is not a disbelief, but is instead the degree to
which the belief was not proven. As the factfinder shifts from
evidence of a to evidence of b, the sureness as to a does not
slip. The degree of a's not being proven does not have any effect
on or interaction with the degree of b's not being proven. In
other words, figuring joint odds is fundamentally different from
conjoining beliefs. 107
The MIN rule can be derived by formal proof. 108 But formal
proofs seem not to convince lawyers. The MIN rule can also be
intuited. The product rule would start producing obvious non-
sense for law cases as the number of elements starts increas-
ing. By contrast, a legal case should be seen as a story
consisting of proven elements, which can be strung element-
by-element as links in a chain whose strength is the strength of
its weakest link. 0 9
Imagine ten or more facts from history each believed by a
historian to 0.90, which link together as the necessary ele-
ments to form a historical story. Should the historian accept
that story? Yes, even though the product rule would put the
probability at 35% or less. Rejecting that path, and instead
accepting the product rule, would lead to such idiocies as Holo-
caust denial: the denier would wonder how anyone could think
that so many events conjoined to produce the Holocaust. Every
story from a historian consists of linked, not multiplied,
beliefs. 1'o
Try this thought experiment. You just discovered that your
credit card is gone, and you must decide whether to cancel the
believes B, then S believes A and B," and defending the principle as generally
valid); supra note 94 (praising simpler rules).
107 See Huber, supra note 53, at 10 (stating "that fair betting ratios should
indeed obey the probability calculus, but that degrees of belief, being different
from fair betting ratios, need not").
108 See Clermont, Fuzzy Logic, supra note 16, at 51 n.32, 67-68 (providing
that proof).
109 See Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1264 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
multiplication of odds in a legal case by saying: "Every event, if specified in detail,
is extremely improbable; indeed, with enough detail it is unique in the history of
the universe. It is always possible to take some probabilities, small to start with,
and multiply them for effect.").
110 See Michael Salter, Countering Holocaust Denial in Relation to the Nurem-
berg Trials, in HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE DENIAL: A CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE 21, 22
(Paul Behrens et al. eds., 2017) (treating Holocaust history); cf Giorgio Resta &
Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, Judicial "Truth" and Historical "Truth": The Case of the
Ardeatine Caves Massacre, 31 LAw & HIST. REV. 843 (2013) (considering the treat-
ment of history in the courtroom). See generally EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE IN HISTORY
AND LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY DIALOGUES 2-62 (William Twining & lain Hampsher-
Monk eds., 2003) (comparing historical inquiry and legal proof); TWINING, supra
note 26, at 352-53 (same).
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card and change all its automatic payments. You check around
without finding it. You then try to reconstruct your recent past.
You think about when you last saw the card. You believe that a
purchase of a shirt prompted the last time you used it. You
believe that the clerk returned the card to you, and that you
put it back in your wallet. You think about who would have had
access to your wallet. You believe that your daughter's boy-
friend is a possible suspect. Of course, you may have just mis-
placed the card, temporarily or permanently. Consider
whether, during this introspection into the course of weighing
evidence to find facts in real life, you were working with odds or
instead with beliefs, disbeliefs, and uncommitted beliefs in the
face of uncertainty. Consider further whether you were
tempted, when combining a series of events, to multiply the
likelihoods of your suspicions. When I do the experiment, I find
myself finding the facts that I believe more than disbelieve, and
then moving on to the next fact without carryover-much as
the law focuses on finding each element that is henceforth
treated as judicial truth."'
Another way to see the difference between the product rule
for odds and the MIN rule for beliefs is to think first of the 1/4
odds of flipping two coins as two heads:
The product rule critically utilizes the idea that if a coin is not
heads, it is tails. Now imagine that you have eyewitnesses who
testify to fairly fleeting views of each of the coins landing as
heads. The coins are now gone. You form a belief of 0.60 in
heads for the first coin, and the same belief for the second coin,
as represented thus:112
Now, is your belief in two heads having come up 25%? Or 0.36?
The MIN rule of belief function theory says 0.60. Why? You
started at zero beliefs. The base rate of 50/50 drops out of
III Empirical testing is sketchy. See Rami Zwick, David V. Budescu & Thomas
S. Wallsten, An Empirical Study of the Interpretation of Linguistic Probabilities, in
Fuzzy SETS IN PSYCHOLOGY 91, 114-16 (Tamas Zft6nyi ed., 1988) (indicating experi-
mentally that people do not naturally use the product rule for degrees of belief).
112 See KOSKO, supra note 96, at 15 ("You paint one picture of the world if you
say there is a 50% chance that an apple sits in the refrigerator. You paint a
different picture if you say half an apple sits in the refrigerator.").
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further consideration.113 The testimony of the eyewitnesses
was pretty good, making your beliefs in heads pretty strong.
Some of your belief remains uncommitted. No witness is saying
there were tails. Your beliefs in tails remain low. So, when you
conjoin the beliefs in heads, you are not working with a 40%
chance of tails, the product rule is inapplicable, and the MIN
rule applies. The point is that the belief in the coins' having
been two heads, expressed as a degree of full knowledge, is
different from the odds of two heads in future flips, the differ-
ence deriving from the presence or absence of the uncommitted
belief that defeats bivalence. (If, instead of working with beliefs,
you wanted to bet on whether there had been two heads, and
there was a way eventually to find out, you would go through
some pignistic transform that makes the odds of each coin
being heads fall between Bel(heads) and Bel(tails), say, 75:25,
so that the probability of two heads would be 56% by the prod-
uct rule. Note that the conjoined probability (56%) is not wildly
different from the conjoined belief (0.60), because probabilities
of facts are, before application of the product rule, bigger than
the corresponding degrees of belief in the facts.)
The more general point is that uncertainties fall mainly
into one of two piles: one of bivalent measures for which the
product rule suffices, and another of multivalent measures to
which the more general MIN rule applies." 4 The probability of
truth, with all views committed between true and false, falls
into the first pile. The belief in truth, as opposed to nonbelief
and disbelief, goes into the second pile. The law could choose to
put legal factfinding in either pile. The choice turns on pol-
icy. 11 There is little doubt, based on extant doctrine expressed
in judicial instructions, that the law has cast legal factfinding
113 For consideration of statistical evidence and its ultimately nonparadoxical
nature, see FIELD ET AL., supra note 24, at 1512-16 (explaining how a factfinder
converts statistical evidence into what I am now calling a belief: "After all, ration-
ally converting the statistical evidence into a [belief] represents a substantial task,
at least in all but the most fanciful cases. The evidence may have to be connected
up with the issue in the individualized case by a series of permissible but uncer-
tain inferences; also, the evidence may have to be discounted for defects in credi-
bility; the probability may have to be adjusted in light of the probative value of the
absence of other proof, an effect most often cutting against the proponent."). For
what turns out to be the doable task of combining statistical and nonstatistical
evidence, see Clermont, Fuzzy Logic, supra note 16, at 46-48. But there is a rule
that certain kinds of evidence-statistics, the opponent's failure to testify, and
disbelief and demeanor of the opponent's evidence-will not satisfy the initial
burden of production, a special rule that acts to ensure a certain completeness of
evidence requirement. See CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 206-07.
114 See supra note 103 (refining the distinction).
115 See supra text accompanying note 59 (framing the policy choice).
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into the second pile. I contend that this choice is the wise one.
The law has no cogent interest in the odds for betting on unat-
tainable truth. Choosing the second pile avoids the many diffi-
culties of dealing in probabilities. Therefore, the law should
seek the measure of the factfinder's belief, based on the imper-
fect evidence presented.
First, of three closing observations that raise additional
advantages of multivalent beliefs over traditional probability, a
neat consequence of the MIN rule is that it makes irrelevant
whether the evidence processing stage proceeded holistically or
atomistically, or whether it ended in a stab at forming a belief
or in something more rigorous. Nothing turns, in the evidence
evaluating stage, on the route taken to the factfinder's measure
of processed strength. If the measure of strength is meticu-
lously calculated element-by-element, and each element of the
proponent's case is found more likely than not, then the con-
junction of elements will be more likely than not by the MIN
rule. If instead the factfinder makes a stab at the proponent's
whole story, and finds it more likely than not, then each of the
elements is necessarily fixed at more likely than not.
Second, conjunction is a matter of immense theoretical
importance."6 Lest you think this conjunctive musing is all a
fine, even if significant, theoretical point that seldom arises in
actual practice,17 however, I would point out that combining
116 See Michael S. Pardo, The Paradoxes of Legal Proof: A Critical Guide, 99
B.U. L. REv. 233, 280-82, 288-89 (2019) (arguing that paradoxes force one to
grapple with the fundamental issues). The product rule would lead to other silli-
ness, such as the aggregation paradox. See Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Aggregating
Probabilities Across Cases: Criminal Responsibility for Unspecifed Offenses, 94
MINN. L. REv., 261, 261 (2009) (building on the aggregation paradox); Ariel Porat &
Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2, 4 (2012) (same). These
theorists would have us convict defendants on the basis of a series of almost-
proven crimes. But see Kevin M. Clermont, Aggregation of Probabilities and Illogic,
47 GA. L. REV. 165, 166 (2012) (resolving the aggregation paradox).
117 Many dismiss the conjunction paradox as a mere theoretical wrinkle with-
out practical worry, arguing that most cases involve a single disputed issue and
that multiple issues are seldom independent. E.g., Lempert, supra note 8, at 452
("One might, for example, argue that the probabilities favoring the existence of the
different elements of a plaintiffs case are generally highly dependent, and that
successful plaintiffs generally prove the separate elements of their cases by far
more than a mere preponderance of the evidence."). More desperately, others
argue that the lamentable distortion caused by ignoring conjunction is offset by
other features of the trial process. E.g., Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggrega-
tion, 99 MICH. L. REv. 723, 734 (2001) (invoking the Condorcet Jury Theorem to
argue that supermajority rules offset the failure to require jurors to conjoin
probabilities). But see Allen & Jehl, supra note 1, at 914-18 (critiquing the
supermajority theory of Levmore); Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of
the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 343-48 (2002) (critiquing the
Condorcet theorizing by Levmore); cf CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 128, 186 n.542
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found facts is a universal and constant task in factfinding. The
same MIN rule applies whether the elements are independent
or interdependent, unlike the product rule. Moreover, the task
is by no means limited to combining elements. The MIN rule
works in the same way on facts within elements as it does
between elements, making any particular division of a claim or
defense into elements nondeterminative.1 18 Also, as the
factfinder induces up toward the element to be proved,119 the
(discussing group decisionmaking); EYAL ZAMIR & DORON TEICHMAN, BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS 120-24, 559-61 (2018) (same). Still others contend that be-
cause factfinders proceed holistically anyway (or the judge might not clearly state,
or the jury might not fully understand, the element-by-element approach to the
standard of proof), we can rest content in the thought that the right standard is
being applied to the conjunction, as long as we do not force the factfinder into a
corner by some device like a special verdict. E.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S.
Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, 23 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 5, 29-30
(2019) (asserting that comparing whole stories somehow avoids the conjunction
paradox); cf. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Power and the Process: Instructions and
the Civil Jury, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1837, 1857-63 (1998) (questioning whether a
special verdict actually changes the jury's decision-making practice).
118 Consequently, "element" should mean a finding necessary for a claim or
defense to succeed under the substantive law. Within elements, the factfinder
uses the usual intuitive techniques for finding facts in a nonquantitative and
approximate fashion. If an element is said to entail separate facts, the process of
combining facts is the same as the proof process between elements. To conjoin the
separate facts (as opposed to the treatment of reinforcing or weakening evidence),
the factfinder uses the same MIN operator for conjunction. See CLERMONT, supra
note 4, at 158-59, 191-92 (discussing proof of facts within elements). The appar-
ent criticality of the number of elements thus melts away.
Nevertheless, the law does split cases into parts that it calls elements and tells
its factfinders to proceed element-by-element, but it does so only to make the
factfinders' path to decision more comprehensible and careful. Also, the element-
by-element instruction avoids the need to instruct on using the MIN rule and
against using the product rule. Therefore, the judges' practice of stressing the
element-by-element instruction is an excellent practice.
119 On the inductive process in finding facts, see generally ANDERSON II AL.,
supra note 22, chs. 3-4 (treating "principles of proof" and "methods of analysis").
Inferences are the mental steps in connecting a piece of evidence to the element to
be proved, or the "probandum." Many inferences may lie between evidence and
probandum. See Morgan, supra note 26, at 943-45. Each inference allows pro-
gress toward the probandum by invoking a generalization, an inductive if-then
statement that is often probabilistic in nature and always subject to some ques-
tion as to its soundness. Those generalizations can be entered in evidence, or
judicially noticed, to the limits of the rules of evidence; but most generalizations
are implicit, with the factfinder permitted to use common knowledge but not
personal knowledge. The factfinder then uses deductive reasoning on the general-
ization to infer from the prior belief in the chain of reasoning to a posterior belief.
But that step is only as strong as the generalization.
On combining catenate inferences, see ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 22, at
107-08. The process is conjunction, as each step must be accepted in a chain.
The evidence's probative force must account for any lack in the credibility of the
piece of evidence or any ancillary evidence undercutting the strength of the infer-
ential generalizations. Nothing in practice suggests that the product rule applies
in this inferential reasoning. Instead, theory holds that the MIN rule applies,
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MIN rule must be used again and again on the task of combin-
ing beliefs.1 2 0 Finally, the task of combination extends well
beyond trial, into pretrial devices and other legal-factfinding
settings inside and outside courts, as well as into settlement
negotiations and other law-office applications of law that de-
pend on expected factfinding.1 2 1 And, as I have repeatedly sug-
gested, we all intuitively combine facts by the MIN rule in
countless settings of daily life. In short, the use of the MIN rule
is almost ubiquitous. We must get conjunction right. Accuracy
is essential not only for efficiency, but also for fairness, as I
shall show. 122
Third, the multivalent-belief model does not differ revolu-
tionarily from the traditional concept of standards of proof. It is
not telling the factfinder to think a new way or to apply Baye-
sian mathematics. It instead is trying to represent how a
factfinder actually thinks, while urging that this is a good way
to think. The major contributions of belief functions and fuzzy
logic are to provide a way to represent the evidential uncer-
tainty that prevails in the real world and, thereby, instruct how
to handle that uncertainty.
because the process involves conjoining multivalent beliefs. So, when an inference
rests on an inference from the piece of evidence, multivalent logic says that the
conjoined strength of belief drops to the likelihood of the least likely step.
120 There are three steps in factfmding: (1) connecting a piece of evidence to
the element to be proved, a process treated in the preceding footnote; (2) combin-
ing pieces of evidence that all bear on one element to form a belief; and (3)
conjoining the series of beliefs on each element to reach a decision, which was the
subject of this subpart D. The MIN rule applies to the first and third steps. But
step #2 is a different process, one that does not centrally involve conjunction.
The combined probative force of the pieces of evidence on an element can
nudge up (as by convergence or corroboration) or down (as by conflict or contra-
diction) with a new piece of evidence. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102,
1105 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("Those who do not take into account conditional probability
are prone to making mistakes in judging evidence. They may think that if a
particular fact does not itself prove the ultimate proposition (e.g., whether the
detainee was part of al-gaida), the fact may be tossed aside and the next fact may
be evaluated as if the first did not exist."). The combination calculation should
proceed, as a theoretical matter, in accordance with one of the multivalent gener-
alizations of Bayes' theorem. See, e.g., CLERMONT, supra note 4, at 157.
121 Settlement on the basis of expected judgment is a two-step process that
involves (i) establishment of paths of decision in favor of each side based on
beliefs, to which the textual discussion is relevant, and then (ii) calculation of the
odds of the decisionmaker's taking each path. See supra note 61 (discussing odds
of future events). Similarly, application of other standards of decision will often
involve (I) retracing decisions based on beliefs and then (ii) calculating the
probability of correctness. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing
standards other than the standard of proof, such as the standard of review).
122 See infra Part III (discussing apparent asymmetries).
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II
RADICAL MODELS
Most, but not all,1 2 3 people who think seriously about this
topic realize that traditional probability conflicts with the stan-
dards of proof.12 4 Accordingly, many have proposed a rethink-
ing of the topic that would allow us to live with the accepted
paradoxes, puzzles, and problems that accompany traditional
probability.12 5 They try to circumvent the difficulties through
heightened sophistication. Consequently, their competing
models are radical reconceptions.
Take the much-condemned conjunction paradox as an ex-
ample again.12 6 Analysis of it has prompted some to abandon
truth as an aim of trial and to embrace acceptability of result
instead.12 7 Radical reconception calls for radical reform. For
acceptability, it should not matter whether the plaintiffs con-
joined story is more likely than not, as long as the plaintiffs
story is more likely than any other single story.128 Others argue
123 E.g., Mark Spottswood. On the Limitations of a Unitary Model of the Proof
Process, 23 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 75 (2019) (defending probabilism in models
of legal decisionmaking against common critiques).
124 Indeed, a recent article grandly insists that we live in the time of a "para-
digm shift" in evidence theory away from probabilism. Allen & Pardo, supra note
117, at 5.
125 E.g., HO, supra note 35, at 127, 155-56, 171 (arguing that finding a fact in
a criminal or civil case requires a categorical belief in the fact, that is, a judging
that the fact is actually true); ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 133-40
(2005) (arguing for viewing standards of proof in terms of allocation of risk);
Christoph Engel, Preponderance of the Evidence Versus Intime Conviction: A Be-
havioral Perspective on a Conflict Between American and Continental European
Law, 33 VT. L. REV. 435 (2009) (arguing for a standard based on psychological
confidence); Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the "Reasonable Jury" Stan-
dard, 84 MIss. L.J. 747 (2015) (arguing for a standard based on statistical confi-
dence); Nesson, supra note 15 (arguing that the process of proof aims at
generating acceptable statements about past events and thus at projecting behav-
ioral norms to the public); D. Michael Risinger, Leveraging Surprise: What Stan-
dards of Proof Imply That We Want from Jurors, and What We Should Say to Them
to Get It, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 965 (2018) (arguing for a standard based on the
degree of the surprise that the factfinder would feel If the found fact hypothetically
were revealed to be false); Vern R. Walker, Preponderance, Probability and War-
ranted Factfinding, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1075, 1136 (1996) (arguing that preponder-
ance means "being warranted by the evidence").
126 Scholars reflexively invoke the paradox as a criticism of current law. E.g.,
Allen & Jehl, supra note 1; Cheng, supra note 3; Jason luliano, Jury Voting
Paradoxes, 113 MICH. L. REV. 405 (2014); David Kaye, The Laws of Probability and
the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 34, 38-41 (1979); Jonathan J. Koehler &
John B. Meixner, Decision Making and the Law: Truth Barriers, in 2 THE WILEY-
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 749, 752 (Gideon Keren &
George Wu eds., 2015); Pardo, supra note 38.
127 E.g., Nesson, supra note 15, at 1366-68.
128 See id. at 1389-90 ("Application of the more-probable-than-not test to each
element produces the most acceptable conclusion as to that element. The con-
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more directly for changing the standard of proof. 1 2 9 We might
raise the standard for the elements to ensure that their con-
junction meets the current standard of proof. ' 3 0
The amazing result is that, even at this late date, there is
no consensus on what the standards of proof require or should
require. It is a theoretical jungle out there. My Article is merely
the latest in a vibrant, contentious, and extensive literature.
A. Inference to the Best Explanation
The most invoked of the various temptations out there is
inference to the best explanation (IBE). This method involves
consideration and analysiss of alternative conjectures to get the
one that best explains the evidence.
IBE was built on abductive reasoning, a way of thinking
first segregated by the early American logician Charles Sanders
Peirce (1839-1914).131 Abduction is a creative process of falli-
ble and defeasible insight. It uses data to generate hypotheses
that are possibly true, which need to be inductively and deduc-
junction of these conclusions constitutes a story that is more probable than any
other story about the same elements. Suppose, for example, that the elements of a
story are A and B, and A (70%) is more probable than not-A (30%), and B (60%) is
more probable than not-B (40%). The conjunction (A & B) (42%) may not be more
probable than its negation (not-(A & B)) (58%). But the conjunction (A & B) (42%)
is more probable than any other version: (A & (not-B)) (28%), ((not-A) & B) (18%),
or ((not-A) & (not-B)) (12%). The application of the more-probable-than-not stan-
dard of proof on an element-by-element basis will produce the single most proba-
ble story." (footnotes omitted)).
129 The two most recent foiays argue at length that the conjunction paradox is
real and that therefore the law should change to conform to the product rule.
David S. Schwartz & Elliott R. Sober, The Conjunction Problem and the Logic of
Jury Findings, 59 WM. & MARY L. REv. 619 (2017); Mark Spottswood, Unraveling
the Conjunction Paradox 15 LAw, PROBABILITY & RISK 259 (2016).
130 E.g., A.P. Dawid, The Difficulty About Conjunction, 36 STATISTICIAN 91, 95-97
(1987) (suggesting a cure of raising the staiidard of proof on each of the elements,
so as to satisfy preponderance for the whole claim or defense).
131 See 5 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAI>ERS OF CHARLES SANDERS
PEIRCE: PRAGMATISM AND PRAGMATICISM 106 (Charles Hartshome & Paul Weiss eds.,
3d ed. 1934) ("Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis.").
Sherlock Holmes, championed for his (allegedly) deductive logic, was actually
using (very lucky) abductive reasoning-which is not that surprising considering
that his stories were written by Arthur Conan Doyle and inspired by Joseph Bell,
both medical doctors. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 8-10, 58-59 ("There'
is no evidence that Peirce and Conan Doyle each knew of the other's work.");
MARGALrr Fox, CONAN DOYLE FOR THE DEFENSE xix-xx, 42, 70-77 (2018) (docu-
menting Bell's influence). "When Holmes says, as he does in his debut appear-
ance, 'In solving a problem of this sort, the grand thing is to be able to reason
backward,' he is singing the praises of abduction." Id. at 81; see id. at 79 n.*
("Conan Doyle, per common parlance, tended to use 'deduction' as a general
rubric denoting any type of logical inference.").
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tively tested and then refined. A line of argument that captures
abduction is this:
A surprising event, a, has occurred.
If a hypothesis, H, were true, then a would follow.
Thus, reason exists to believe H might be true.13 2
Logicians later came to formalize abduction as a problem-
solving method.13 3 As such, IBE involves generating and test-
ing hypotheses like H, then falsifying some and eventually set-
tling on the best one as the explanation. It dominates the
scientific method's production of explanations of generic
events, 3 4 having produced such fruits as Darwin's theories of
evolution'3 5 but also such clunkers as Ptolemaic astronomy. 136
It alters the line of argument thus:
A surprising event, a, has occurred.
If a hypothesis, H, were true, then a would follow.
No competing hypothesis explains a as well.
Thus, reason exists to believe H probably is true.137
IBE depends on a good-faith and thorough search for a
pool of decent explanations. Here arises the strongest criticism
of IBE, namely, the "argument from a bad lot."' 3 8 All that IBE
can deliver is the best explanation from the explanations con-
sidered. This best explanation could be merely the best of a bad
lot. One could never know if it is true. One could not know it is
132 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 56-58 (formulating such a line of
argument).
133 See Gilbert H. Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, 74 PHIL. REV.
88, 88 (1965) (developing "inference to the best explanation" from abductive rea-
soning); Giovanni Tuzet, Abduction, IBE and Standards of Proof, 23 INT'L J. EVI-
DENCE & PROOF 114, 115-17 (2019) (delineating the relationship of IBE to
abduction).
134 See generally PETER LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION (2d ed. 2004)
(providing the classic treatment of the use of IBE in science).
135 See Amalia Amaya, Inference to the Best Legal Explanation, in LEGAL EVI-
DENCE AND PROOF, supra note 29, at 135, 137 (giving examples). Science's so-called
weight of the evidence methodology is such an approach. See Milward v. Acuity
Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2011) (admitting expert
evidence based on the weight of the evidence approach: "The scientist must (1)
identify an association between an exposure and a disease, (2) consider a range of
plausible explanations for the association, (3) rank the rival explanations accord-
ing to their plausibility, (4) seek additional evidence to separate the more plausi-
ble from the less plausible explanations, (5) consider all of the relevant available
evidence, and (6) integrate the evidence using professional judgment to come to a
conclusion about the best explanation.").
136 See Laudan, supra note 78, at 293 (observing that IBE "routinely warrants
the acceptance of scientific theories and hypotheses that subsequent empirical
research has repeatedly revealed to be false").
137 See Amaya, supra note 135, at 136 (formulating such a line of argument).
138 See BAs C. VAN FRAASSEN, LAWS AND SYMMETRY 143 (1989) (developing the
criticism); Amaya, supra note 135, at 152-53 (recounting the criticism).
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even probably true unless one actually knows that the true
explanation was probably included among the explanations
considered.
Nonetheless, medical diagnosis obviously employs IBE in
trying to explain unique events.139 Medicine's so-called differ-
ential diagnosis approach successively eliminates possible
causes of a medical condition to reveal the best explanation of
the conceivable alternatives.140 Here, IBE appears to be a
proper mode of analysis, correct and useful. But is it extend-
able to law? Quite simply, diagnosis does not involve applying a
standard of proof, such as more likely than not. Incidentally, it
proceeds without a whiff of multivalence.
In sum, IBE works for only certain kinds of problems and
can take us only so far. Medical diagnosis is a very different
task from legal factfinding. Diagnosis seeks by a process of
elimination the best of all explanations one can imagine, and
then uses it to guide treatment. The law is asking whether the
proponent's version of the facts meets the standard of proof,
say, that it is more likely true than false. Applying IBE to law
cannot therefore be direct. 141
B. Relative Plausibility
Still, some have tried to twist IBE to the legal task.'4 2 Some
of these theorists, realizing that IBE does not really fit, have
invented a new approach that merely uses the verbiage of
139 See L. Jonathan Cohen, Bayesianism Versus Baconianism in the Evalua-
tion of Medical Diagnoses, 31 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 45, 58-59 (1980) (developing the
benefits of IBE over traditional probability, while likening IBE to the nonadditive
logic of Baconian probability).
140 See Hall v. Conoco Inc., 886 F.3d 1308, 1314 (10th Cir. 2018) (rejecting
expert evidence based on differential diagnosis because of an inadequate pool of
possible causes, and observing: "An expert need not consider and rule out every
conceivable cause. But the expert must still consider all plausible causes and rule
out the less plausible ones until only the most likely cause remains." (citations
omitted)); Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262-63 (4th Cir. 1999)
(admitting expert evidence based on differential diagnosis).
141 See Laudan, supra note 78, at 303 ("IBE cannot function as a standard of
proof. . . .").
142 E.g., Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of
Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REv. 557, 567-70 (2013) (discussing adjudicative factfinding as
IBE); Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation,
27 LAw & PHIL. 223, 227-42 (2008) (discussing how IBE explains judicial proof); cf
Amalia Amaya, The Explanationist Revolution in Evidence Law, 23 INT'L J. EVI-
DENCE & PROOF 60, 65 (2019) (arguing for evidentialist and coherentist versions of
explanationism); Sean P. Sullivan, A Likelihood Story: The Theory of Legal Fact-
Finding, 90 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 19-34 (2019) (taking important steps toward
formalizing the approach as "likelihood theory," which nonetheless is ubject to
much of the same rebuttal as relative plausibility).
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IBE.14 3 They call their creation the relative plausibility theory
(RP), or explanationism in the most recent reworking.144
RP posits that the factfinder constructs (i) the overall story
(or explanation, in the latest preferred terminologyl4 5) that the
plaintiff is spinning and (ii) another story (or stories, in some
variants of the theory4 6 ) that the defendant is or could be
spinning. The factfinder then compares the two stories and
gives victory to the plaintiff if the plaintiffs version is more
plausible than the defendant's. This choice between alternative
competing narratives is largely an ordinal process rather than
a cardinal one.147
No doubt, RP has some advantages, which explains why it
is pushed. It does echo the way lawyers talk about their cases.
It embraces the use of humans' strong capacity for relative
judgment rather that absolute judgment. It strikes the tone of
psychology's holistic models, while echoing the words of abduc-
tion and IBE.
143 See Allen & Jehl, supra note 1, at 929-43 (explaining the origin of the new
approach).
144 See Allen & Pardo, supra note 117, at 6 n.1 (updating name of theory).
145 See id. at 7 n.7, 17 n.86, 31 (distinguishing "story"); supra note 30 (dis-
cussing the story model).
146 Compare Reid Hastie, What's the Story? Explanations and Narratives in
Civil Jury Decisions, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIL JUSTICE 23, 31-32 (Brian H. Born-
stein et al. eds., 2008) (expanding the theory to allow for a party's multiple sto-
ries), with Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose ofEvidence Theory, 66 VAND.
L. REv. 547, 598-99 (2013) (discussing the theory's difficulties in handling multi-
ple stories). In my view, this supposed problem of "story" or "stories" disappears if
one takes the plaintiffs story (or the defendant's story on an affirmative defense)
to be one that encompasses all parts of the claim that the plaintiff must prove. The
defendant's story then includes all versions that negate one of those parts. The
parties do not have to formulate these stories expressly, as long as the factfinder
can construct the story out of the allegations and the evidence. See Allen & Pardo,
supra note 117, at 24-26 (accepting this approach to alternative explanations,
and repudiating the earlier approach set out in, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, The Nature
of Juridical Proof 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 409 (1991) ("The defendant could be
required to plead and prove an episode that excludes the possibility of instanti-
ating the formal elements of the substantive law, which simply means that if the
defendant's claim is accepted, it falsifies at least one formal element.")). Thus,
when I refer to a party's "story," I am invoking this broad notion of the party's best
explanation unless otherwise stated. Note, however, that a broad notion of "story"
gives the defendant the benefit of disjunctive proof, while the plaintiff remains
saddled with conjunction, a situation that causes RP to unravel completely. See
infra text accompanying note 154 (discussing survival of the conjunction para-
dox); cf infra text accompanying note 162 (showing that considering all the defen-
dant's stories is equivalent, under MIN and MAX rules, to considering the
defendant's single best story).
147 See Allen & Jehl, supra note 1, at 938 ("[Plroof is largely comparative or
ordinal rather than cardinal.").
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Yet, RP has no theoretical underpinning, so nothing ex-
plains why RP's path is the right path to follow. First, RP rests
on an assumption that factfinders proceed holistically, but RP
does not and cannot maintain that holism is normatively
sound.1 48 Second, despite claims to the contrary, abduction
does not justify RP, as abduction is a way for the investigator
creatively to imagine possible explanations for later testing,
rather than a way to reason to a conclusion.' 4 9 Third, verbiage
aside, RP is not a version of IBE, so its bow to IBE adds no
support.5 0
Instead, RP primarily looks to the parties in an adversary
system to select the story candidates. It does not consider all
possible explanations or even demand a decent pool of expla-
nations, but by the theorists' fiat it limits consideration to two
contesting explanations, which are each party's position on the
allegations and evidence. This fiat makes life simpler, but
sends the "argument from a bad lot" right through the roof. 11
There is no way to justify RP's narrow focus, other than an
appeal to adversariness as implying a law of the jungle: "You
put up your best story, and you, defendant, do the same. We'll
pick the better one."
The lack of theory permeates RP. First, by another fiat, this
time in defiance of the law, it repeals the requirement of a
standard of proof, at least in any traditional sense. No longer
must the case be, say, more likely than not. The plaintiffs story
need only be the better of two. That is, RP does not try to
explain what the law meant when it articulated a standard of
proof; RP is preaching that we should ignore what the law says
and instead apply an invented test that gives good results.
148 See Allen & Pardo, supra note 117, at 30-31 (asserting holism is the pre-
vailing practice); Simon, Thin Empirics, supra note 30, at 86-87 (giving three
reasons to beware of holistic factfinding).
149 See Allen & Pardo, supra note 117, at 6 n.1 (claiming that abduction
provides the theory's "epistemological foundation"). Those authors simply declare:
"Abduction, in other words, is the process by which legal fact-finders arrive at
probabilistic-i.e., inductive, non-demonstrative-conclusions." Id. at 20-21.
That formulation of abduction has no support in the literature. It seems instead to
refer to abductive validation, that is, some technique like IBE, to select among the
explanations that abduction has yielded. So, RP's reliance on abduction adds
nothing beyond its relying on IBE.
150 See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Probability, Explanation and Inter-
ference: A Reply, 11 INL' J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 307, 314-17 (2007) (defending their
IBE approach in a way that pares it back into a form consistent with bare RP);
Laudan, supra note 78, at 297-305 (demonstrating that, in any event, IBE holds
little promise of explaining or illuminating the standards of proof).
151 See Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence
Theory, 87 VA. L. REv. 1551, 1575 (2001) (criticizing that "the relative plausibility
theory is stated in terms of stories advanced by the parties").
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Second, a final fiat dictates that factfmders should simply ig-
nore probabilities. RP does nothing about the paradoxes or
puzzles of traditional probability, like conjunction. RP accepts
them as facts of lifel 5 2 and then sweeps them under the rug.1 5 3
True, if the factfinder just compares stories, any oddity con-
cerning the necessary likelihood of the elements disappears,
but only from view.15
Beyond a lack of theory that necessitates resort to fiat, RP
presents a host of related practical problems.1 55 Most seri-
ously, it contradicts the law in a couple of ways. First, it ignores
the law stated in judicial instructions. It does not contemplate
going element-by-element. It tells the factfinder to create holis-
tic stories and compare them.15 6 Second, it might force the
defendant to be much more active than the law requires. It
appears to compel the defendant, at least as a practical matter,
to formulate a competing version of the truth. The defendant
seemingly loses the legal right to stand mute and still
prevail.'5 7
152 See Ronald J. Allen, The Declining Utility of Analyzing Burdens of Persua-
sion, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 995, 996, 997, 1004 (2018) (calling the paradox "a
feature of the world"): Allen & Pardo, supra note 117, at 35 n.221, 39, 52 (same);
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Clarifying Relative Plausibility: A Rejoinder, 23
INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 205, 212, 213 n.26 (2019) (same).
153 See Allen & Pardo, supra note 117, at 17-18 ("Rather than assessing A and
B serially and attaching a probability to each, fact-finders evaluate whether the
plaintiffs explanation (which will include or entail A & B) is better than the
defendant's explanation (which will omit A or B, or both).").
154 See id. at 29 ("Under our account, however, the conjunction problem is
avoided because the standard of proof applies to the case as a whole in evaluating
explanations and is distributed to both parties."). RP theorists think that they can
avoid the paradox by simply comparing two whole stories. Yet, given their view of
the product rule as a feature of life, and given the economic aim that conjunctive
liability be more likely in fact than disjunctive nonliability, the plaintiffs elements
individually must have satisfied a much higher standard of proof for his conjoined
story to satisfy the law's standard of proof. Meanwhile, the defendant can aggre-
gate the probabilities of all her alternative versions. That is, the defendant would
enjoy the advantage of disjunctive proof, while the plaintiff would remain saddled
with conjunction. RP's refusing to ask for element-by-element likelihoods does not
make the paradox disappear. That is just sticking one's head in the sand.
155 See Richard D. Friedman, "E" Is for Eclectic: Multiple Perspectives on Evi-
dence, 87 VA. L. REV. 2029, 2046-47 (2001) (noting problems with RP).
156 See Ronald J. Allen, Standards of Proof and the Limits of Legal Analysis 14
(Northwestern University School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, May 3, 2011), http: / /ssrn.com/abstract= 1830344 [http://
perma.cc/AAR6-5X5W] (acknowledging the inconsistencies between jury instruc-
tions and RP).
157 See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 11, § 339, at 660-61 (explaining
that because juries bring their own experiences, it is possible for a verdict to find
for a defendant who offers nothing in opposition to the plaintiffs evidence). Admit-
tedly, RP's burden on the defendant could conform to the law if RP allows that the
defendant's story could come solely from the factfinder's forming its own disbelief
1502
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Moreover, it is not a flexible method, as also shown in a
couple of ways. First, it comes with a fair amount of baggage.15 8
It accepts the holistic processing of evidence, rather than for-
mulating a standard of proof that can handle any view of the
evidence regardless of the factfinder's processing method. Sec-
ond, by calling for a head-to-head ordinal comparison of two
stories, it has encountered minor difficulties with handling
standards other than preponderance.15 9
Finally, even after countless articles, it is an underex-
plained method. It gives little guidance as to how the choose
which story is better. IBE at least confronts this problem, albeit
with no definite conclusion.6 0 RP instead depends on the un-
fortunate word "plausible." Is plausibility all that the law
should ask for? Even accepting "more plausible" as the test,
what does it mean? How does it work when, say, the plaintiffs
story is strong on all but one element? Resorting to probabili-
ties just for illustration, imagine the plaintiffs story is 51%,
51%, 51%, and 40% on four elements, and the defendant's
of the plaintiffs story. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 117, at 2 1-24 (arguing, in
their latest version, that the defendant's burden is no more burdensome than
this).
158 See Craig R. Callen, Commentary, Kicking Rocks with Dr. Johnson: A Com-
ment on Professor Allen's Theory, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 423, 432-39 (1991) (dis-
cussing some problems with RP).
159 See Friedman, supra note 155, at 2047 ("Therefore, Allen has previously
recognized that the concept of cardinality must come into play."); Laudan, supra
note 78, at 303 ("Why IBE will not work as a standard of proof is that it aims to be
a universal standard of credibility and not a context-specific measure of degree of
proof."); cf Allen, supra note 146, at 413 (attempting to explain the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard as not being satisfied if the factfinder "concludes that
there is a plausible scenario consistent with innocence," while admitting that the
clear-and-convincing standard is "troublesome" under his theory because it
seems cardinal); Allen & Leiter, supra note 46, at 1528 (saying that the prosecu-
tion must "show that there is no plausible account of innocence"); Pardo, supra
note 38, at 1829 (attempting to explain the clear-and-convincing standard as
requiring that "the plaintiffs explanation must be clearly and convincingly better
than the defendant's explanation"). For their latest iteration, see Allen & Pardo,
supra note 117, at 16-17, 26-29.
160 See Laudan, supra note 78, at 296 & n.13 (listing the variety of tests that
theorists have forwarded); David A. Schum, Species of Abductive Reasoning in
Fact Investigation in Law, 22 CARDOzO L. REV. 1645, 1659 (2001) ("[W]e may not
have any settled criterion for saying what is the 'best' explanation."); cf. Amaya,
supra note 135, at 138-46 (using a coherentist approach to evaluate the story);
Floris Bex, Analysing Stories Using Schemes, in LEGAL EVIDENCE AND PROOF, supra
note 29, at 93 (udging plausibility by how well the story fits a specific description
of typical event structures). Lately, and not too helpfully, RP theorists have turned
toward this inconclusive literature to suggest: "In general, explanations are evalu-
ated based on criteria such as consistency, coverage, simplicity, coherence, con-
silience, and fit with background knowledge." Allen & Pardo, supra note 117, at 7
n.7; see id. at 16, 19 (admitting that there is no general recipe for ranking
explanations).
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story is 49%, 49%, 49%, and 60%. When the factfinder goes to
compare the whole stories, which is more plausible?
C. Reconciliation of Models
Ironically, a theory to support RP does exist, and it resolves
those problems of impracticality, inflexibility, and impenetra-
bility. The solution lies in the multivalent-belief model. Un-
knowingly, RP theorists have formulated a fuzzy technique for
dealing with more likely than not. RP thereby ends up as an
overly specific statement of multivalent-belief theory. I can
demonstrate this near equivalence either by showing how the
multivalent-belief model can produce the more dialectical RP
model or by showing how RP can generalize into multivalent
beliefs.
First, consider how the multivalent-belief model works, us-
ing a civil case as the example. If the factfinder goes element-
by-element, a plaintiffs win means that each element in the
claim is more likely than not, in the sense that the fuzzy belief
in the element exceeds the fuzzy disbelief. By the MIN rule, the
conjunction of elements is also more likely than not. By the
MAX rule for disjunction, the likelihood of any of all the con-
testing stories being true is the likelihood of the strongest dis-
belief of any one element. But we already know that for a
victorious plaintiff, each and every element is more likely than
not. Accordingly, the plaintiffs conjoined story is more likely
than the disjunction of all the contesting stories. And if that is
so, the plaintiffs conjoined story is more likely than the defen-
dant's best story. Therefore, if the plaintiff prevails under the
multivalent-belief model, it prevails under RP.
Second, going the other way is a little tougher, because RP
is bereft of theory. Assume that the best story constructible for
the plaintiff is "better" than the best story constructible for the
defendant, whether the latter is a single story or embodies
alternative versions. The most sensible meaning of "better," I
posit, is that the degree of belief in the conjoined elements of
the plaintiffs best story exceeds the degree of belief in the dis-
joined denials by the defendant. By the MIN and MAX rules,
this inequality means that the weakest element of the plaintiffs
story is more likely than the strongest element of any con-
testing story. If that is so, then every element of the plaintiffs
story is more likely than the corresponding element of any
contesting story. Therefore, if the plaintiff prevails under RP, it
prevails under the multivalent-belief model.
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In other words, RP requires the plaintiff to formulate his
best explanation, which is as likely as its weakest link. The
defendant can offer her best explanation, or just rely on denial
of some or all elements, with her best explanation being as
likely as its strongest link. RP theorists provide no justification
for comparing just the two, but instead unknowingly rely on
the MIN and MAX rules of fuzzy logic.' 6 1 If the fuzzy belief in the
plaintiffs version is greater than the fuzzy belief in her position,
then it does make sense to call it better. Indeed, by the MIN and
MAX rules, the plaintiffs story is superior to all competing
accounts. So, one does not have to consider all competing ac-
counts, but can decide that the plaintiffs story is better after
focusing on only the defendant's single best version. 162
In sum, asking whether the degree of belief in each element
of the plaintiffs claim exceeds the corresponding degree of dis-
belief is equivalent in effect to comparing the plaintiffs and the
defendant's single best stories constructible out of the allega-
tions and the evidence. The latter approach is cheered by RP
theorists because of its practical advantages, such as con-
forming to how adversarial lawyers talk about their cases. But
the convergence of the two methods means that the multiva-
lent-belief model can likewise claim all those practical advan-
tages, as it too can speak in terms of comparing best stories.
The difference is that only the multivalent-belief model has a
firm theoretical foundation. 163
161 The closest they get to acknowledging this reliance is their confusingly, and
I think wrongly, noting that, "of course, the most probable explanation supporting
each side will be the disjunction of all possible explanations supporting that side
(it will be at least as probable as any single disjunct or subset)." Allen & Pardo,
supra note 117, at 26. In fact, they full-throatedly criticize the multivalent-belief
model. See Allen, supra note 152, at 1003-14; Allen & Pardo, supra note 117, at
49-58; Pardo, supra note 116, at 275-78. But see Clermont, Common Sense,
supra note 23, at 1074 n.43 (rebuttal); Kevin M. Clermont, The Silliness ofMagical
Realism, 23 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 147 (2019) (same).
162 Another route exists to justify looking at only the defendant's single best
version. Under "ranking theory," looking at defendant's single best version allows
ignoring all other defendant versions. But accepting ranking theory works out to
be the equivalent of accepting multivalent beliefs. See Huber, supra note 53, at
16-20 (comparing belief function theory and ranking theory); Wolfgang Spohn, A
Survey of Ranking Theory, in DEGREES OF BELIEF, supra note 22, at 185 (giving a
good general treatment of ranking theory).
163 Another radical reconception that ends up very near to the multivalent-
belief model emerges from DALE A. NANCE, THE BURDENS OF PROOF 1-14 (2016)
(arguing for adding a measure of Keynesian weight, which turns on the complete-
ness of evidence, to the usual standards of proof that look to the discriminatory
power of the evidence). His book speaks in terms of probabilities and accepts the
conjunction paradox as a problem. See id. at 74-78. But since then Professor
Nance has taken to speaking in terms of belief functions rather than probabilities.
See Nance, supra note 75, at 30 ("It is understandable for legal theorists to
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PLAINTIFF/DEFENDANT ASYMMETRIES
I cannot conclude that radical reconception and reform of
the standards of proof are unnecessary simply because the
multivalent-belief model avoids the difficulties of traditional
probability theory in producing accurate results. Other theo-
rists attack the law's standards on the grounds of fundamental
fairness as a process value. They argue that the playing field is
not level. Plaintiffs have to prove a string of elements, while
defendants can succeed by disproving only one, so creating an
asymmetry. Even if criminal cases are supposed to be uneven
contests, this asymmetry seems unfair in civil cases.164
The key to meeting this argument is to accept the just-
developed idea that the multivalent-belief model requires that
plaintiffs best story be more likely than the defendant's best
story constructible out of the allegations and the evidence.
From this vantage point, one can see that the plaintiff and the
defendant are on a level playing field after all.
A. Three Supposed Asymmetries
Even putting accuracy problems aside, plaintiff/defendant
asymmetries appear to undermine fairness. Basically, defend-
ants seem much better positioned than plaintiffs. Some might
attempt to make use of Shafer's theory and its willingness to embrace non-Baye-
sian belief functions."). And he has lately used fuzzy logic's progeny in the form of
possibility theory to resolve the conjunction paradox. See Nance, supra note 66, at
1036 ("If one thinks of A and B as the elements of the claim, C, then [possibility
theory's MIN rule] provides a potential solution to the so-called conjunction para-
dox . . .. [Whether that standard [of proof] has been met as to the claim, C, can be
determined entirely by assessing whether it has been met as to each of A and B.").
The minor remaining difference from my theoretical outlook lies in his distaste for
my formulations of the higher standards of proof, which he would define in terms
of ratios of Bel(a) to Bel(not-a). See Nance, supra note 75, at 15-20, 28-29; cf.
supra note 80 (rejecting ratios as standards of proof). (His radical reform further
invents a separate role for the judicial gatekeeper, who would stop a case from
going to factfinding unless, foggily, the completeness of evidence "has been practi-
cally optimized by the parties' presentation." Nance, supra note 75, at 28. I would
deal with that concern, as the law does, by the factfinder's taking any evidential
inadequacies into account in forming beliefs and disbeliefs and by the judge's
applying the usual tests for judgment as a matter of law, judicial notice, and like
procedures. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 71 & 113 (discussing reason-
able-possibility threshold, evidential defects, and initial burden of production,
respectively).)
164 On the importance of equality to procedural justice, see Mike Redmayne,
Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation, 62 MOD. L. REV. 167, 171-74 (1999); Law-
rence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 286-89 (2004).
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argue that this is how things should be.16 5 But approving a
pronounced bias should await proving that the bias even
exists.
First among the asymmetries, there is the philosopher's
version of probability's problem of infinite alternatives. I have
already alluded to Hume's problem with induction. 166 Accumu-
lating observations can fortify a hypothesis, but fortification
can never arrive at the point of proven certainty; meanwhile, a
single observation can effectively falsify the hypothesis.16 7 This
situation seems to create an asymmetry between proof and
disproof. The plaintiff faces a Sisyphean task, while the defen-
dant goes for a walk in the park.
Second, the logician's version of conjunction paradox
arises from the realization that the plaintiff must prove each of
several elements, while the defendant need disprove only one. If
the plaintiff fails to show any one element, he loses. If the
defendant can succeed on any one element, she wins. Thus,
the defendant can push many different possibilities, while the
plaintiff is less likely to succeed in backing a consistent story
that embraces all the elements.
Third, the related lawyer's idea, developed elegantly in a
recent article, holds that any rate of adjudicative error, even if
random and unbiased, will hurt plaintiffs and help defend-
ants. s6 8 "As a result, the plaintiffs chances of losing the case
undeservedly are much higher than the defendant's."16 9 The
authors contend that because a single denial (or a single af-
firmative defense) will defeat the plaintiff who must prove a
165 See Levmore, supra note 117, at 733 ("[Slome observers (and perhaps
jurors and judges) will be comfortable with a decision in favor of liability because
of the intuition that making negligent parties pay 'too much' is harmless or even
healthy."); Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs That Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of the
Evidence Law and Their Combined Economic Justification, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1199,
1199-234 (2001) (justifying the suppression of the product rule on deterrence
grounds).
166 See supra text accompanying note 44 (discussing the "problem with
induction").
167 See 7 ALBERT EINSTEIN, Induction and Deduction in Physics, in THE COL-
LECTED PAPERS OF ALBERT EINsrEIN 108, 109 (2002) ("Thus, a theory can very well be
found to be incorrect . . if a fact is not in consonance with one of its conclusions.
But the truth of a theory can never be proven."). A related idea here, but one not
pertinent to standards of proof, is Karl Popper's falsiflability: a statement, hypoth-
esis, or theory has falsifiability (or refutability or testability) only if showing it to be
false by observation is conceivable. See Stephen Thornton, Karl Popper, in STAN-
FORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 2 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016), https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ [https://perma.cc/2BNZ-HW8U] (situating
falsifiability in Popper's thought).
168 Jef De Mot & Alex Stein, Talking Points, 2015 U. ILL. L. REv. 1259, 1261.
169 Id.
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string of elements, one unfavorable mistake in factfinding will
be fatal to the deserving plaintiff but not to the deserving defen-
dant. The defendant can exploit this asymmetrical risk of error
by forcing the plaintiff to settle below true value. The authors
propose three shocking reforms to level the playing field: limit-
ing defendants to a single defense for each cause of action;
introducing a damage multiplier for plaintiffs who prevail at
trial; or fixing all tort and contract damages at a fraction corre-
sponding to the party's comparative fault.170 To me, the ex-
tremist nature of their proposed cures imply error in their
diagnosis of disease.
B. Resolution of Asymmetries
The three asymmetries stem from quite similar roots. One
observation resolves all three: the plaintiff need show only that
his theory of the case is better than the defendant's single best
theory. When the factfinder compares best stories, it is looking
at all the elements of the defendant's best story, just as it is
looking at all the elements of the plaintiffs best story. There-
fore, the plaintiff and the defendant remain on a level playing
field.
This resolution of asymmetries should not be surprising.
An uneven playing field would result in serious bias as well as
inefficiency. It is hard to imagine that our legal system could
have survived for hundreds of years if it produced skewed re-
sults with consistency. The law should have evolved, and it did,
toward producing optimal results. 171 Likewise astounding, why
would commentators and parties have waited centuries to no-
tice such stark injustices?1 72 In fact, the commentators today
cannot even agree on who has the advantage. Some stress the
load on the plaintiff to prove a string of elements. 173 But others
170 See id. at 1276-85 (sketching proposed reforms).
171 Cf. THOMAS J. MICELI, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 21-27
(2018) (discussing the theory of the common law's efficiency); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.7 (8th ed. 2011) (similar).
172 The earliest known observation of the conjunction paradox lies in the inno-
vative JEROME MICHAEL & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 140-43
(1931). The supposed disparate effect of error lay undiscovered until 2015's De
Mot & Stein, supra note 168, at 1263 (saying that their article "is the first to
identify this bias").
173 See David A. Moran, Jury Uncertainty, Elemental Independence and the
Conjunction Paradox: A Response to Allen and Jehl, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 945,
946-47, 950 ("Anyone who has ever litigated a real case knows the exact opposite
of the conjunction paradox is true: the more disputed elements the plaintiff has to
prove, the less likely the plaintiff is to prevail ... [because] the jury will find at
least one element to be less likely than not.").
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say the proponent benefits from how the ancients (and
modems) divided our causes of action (and defenses) into ele-
ments: the more subdivisions, the lower the conjunctive
probability that suffices for victory.17 4
First, considering the three asymmetries, the standard of
proof puts an equal burden on plaintiff and defendant, if one
puts the burden of persuasion aside. The plaintiff need not
deliver certain truth, so Hume's problem with induction is no
problem for legal trials.17 5 The defendant faces a task similar to
the plaintiffs. Each has the task of comparatively winning the
factfinder's belief.
Second, because the standard of proof is equivalent to
comparing the parties' best stories, the criticality of the ele-
ments disappears.'7 6 The plaintiff must show that his story is
more likely than not, and the defendant depends on that story
not being more likely. Their tasks are comparable.
Third, there is no disparate risk of error in the battle of best
stories. An error in favor of the plaintiff while judging the plain-
tiffs whole story is as likely as an error in favor of the defen-
dant, so that the error could defeat the defendant as easily as it
could defeat the plaintiff. Thus, I can put my argument simply:
Once one perceives that the trial process asks whom the
factfinder believes more, rather than asking for the multiplica-
tive odds of a hypothetical revelation of truth, one can sense
that the playing field has leveled out.
The factfinder can, but need not, go element-by-element,
deciding whether the defendant wins on this point and, if not,
whether the defendant wins on the next point, and so on
through all the points. But by operation of the MIN and MAX
rules, the fight between the plaintiffs position and all the de-
fendant's possible positions, however fought, comes down to a
single question: is the plaintiffs weakest link stronger than the
defendant's showing on that element? The field of engagement
at any one time will be on one element. An error could affect
that element. The error might weaken the defendant's showing
on the element or, just as easily, might weaken the plaintiffs
showing. The playing field is level.
174 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Fred Bertram & Michael J. TOke, Optimal
Issue Separation in Modem Products Liability LItigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1653,
1655-59, 1667-75 (1995) (discussing "substantive issue separation" and its pro-
cedural treatment).
175 See supra text accompanying note 45 ("Yet this situation causes the law no
worry because the law does not seek or demand complete truth or knowledge.").
176 See supra note 118 (discussing "element").
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The usual comeback to my view is that adopting a fuzzy
logic outlook cannot change the world. Because fuzzy logic is
just another language for talking about likelihood, it can never
change the reality it describes. For example, in the third asym-
metry, the argument would be that a compound gamble (where
the defendant has multiple grounds on which to win) is riskier
for the plaintiff than a single-event gamble, and switching to
fuzzy logic will not change those betting odds.17 7 Of course I
agree. The reality is the same, and the betting odds remain the
same.
Within that reality, however, one can look at different as-
pects of reality. The law is looking at a different aspect of reality
than is the bettor. The law looks at which side's position is
more believable, rather than at the compound betting odds on
a string of guesses for each of which all views were committed
fully between true and false. The reason the law looks at com-
parative beliefs, not compound bets, is that it wants factfinders
to hold all the different kinds of uncertainty in mind when
combining their findings. Traditional probability ignores episte-
mic ignorance resulting from imperfect evidence and ignores
epistemic indeterminacy resulting from vagueness, but multi-
valent beliefs retain a measure for epistemic uncertainties in
the form of uncommitted belief. The law will therefore dictate
looking at multivalent beliefs whenever, for the sake of accu-
racy, a decisionmaker needs to keep track of epistemic uncer-
tainties in addition to any aleatory uncertainty.
To sum up, let me return to my early contention that the
two measures of degree of belief and probability of truth really
do differ.1 78 First, as to the mere existence of differences, based
177 See E-mail from Alex Stein, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, to
author (June 23, 2018, 17:49 EST) (on file with author) ("[With everything else
being equal, a compound gamble is always riskier than a single-event gamble, and
stating those gambles as fuzzy probabilities won't change anything. Looking into
current sporting events, I surely have a better chance to be right in predicting that
the German soccer team wifl beat South Korea on Wednesday than in saying this,
plus, that Mexico and Sweden will draw. How can any fuzzy or other conceptual-
ization of probability make it different? And if I am right here, then I don't see how
the plaintiffs compound gamble in my article differs from this one. You can use
the fuzzy sets theory to reason about probabilities, but it can't change the under-
lying reality .. ."); cf Allen & Pardo, supra note 117, at 51 ("There are four major
problems with Clermont's application of fuzzy set theory to juridical proof. The
first is that changing one's theory of probability does not change the world or one's
knowledge of the world."). But see The Affair: 406 (Showtime television broadcast
July 22, 2018) (Helen explaining to Alison that Californians believe that "you can
manifest your reality," the idea being that "if there's something in your life you
want to change, you just need to think differently and it will change").
178 See supra text accompanying note 62 (introducing that contention).
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on the allocation of uncertainty, there can be little logical dis-
pute by now. Second, there is no mathematical doubt that if
the factfinder is thinking in terms of degrees of belief, or fuzzy
beliefs, then rules like MIN and MAX govern how to combine
beliefs. Third, thinking in those terms and applying those rules
clarify how the standards of proof should operate and so bring
along many practical benefits, such as avoiding the logical diffi-
culties of probabilities and quashing misguided "reforms" of
asymmetry. Although it would be conceivable for the law to ask
its factfinders to judge the probability of truth, asking them
that question would be very undesirable as a policy matter. The
law has been wise to ask its factfinders to adjudge their degrees
of belief instead. That, then, is my message: the law has fol-
lowed good policy in asking factfinders for beliefs rather than
for odds. 179
CONCLUSION
The pieces have fallen into place. The traditional
probability model raises all sorts of difficulties. The difficulties
are so many, indeed, that one should wonder why the whole
supposedly skewed proof process has not collapsed of its own
weight. Yet from the vantage of multivalent belief, the difficul-
ties all vanish. They turn out to be illusions produced by the
academics' faulty probabilistic premises.
The Article's first part explained that the standard of proof
calls for the factfinder to evaluate the evidence by comparing its
degree of belief in the proponent's position with its degree of
contradictory disbelief. The factfinder should disregard its un-
committed belief, except under the criminal standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Under preponderance, the propo-
nent prevails if Bel(a) > Bel(not-a), with no need to show that
Bel(a) > 0.50. This multivalent-belief model does not encounter
those paradoxes, puzzles, and problems that plague the tradi-
tional probability model.
The second part argued that without the prod of the tradi-
tional probability model's deficiencies, no radical reconception
or reform of the standards of proof is necessary. In particular,
the method of inference to the best explanation is inapplicable
to legal factfinding. And its offshoot of relative plausibility
turns out to be an obscurely rewritten version of the multiva-
lent-belief model shorn of theoretical justification.
179 See supra text accompanying note 114 (developing that policy argument).
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The third part demonstrated that viewing the standard of
proof as a comparison of belief and disbelief puts the plaintiff
and defendant on a level playing field. That the plaintiff must
prove a whole series of elements, while the defendant needs to
disprove only one, is not actually an asymmetry. While the
plaintiff must prove that the degree of belief in its story meets
the standard of proof, the defendant prevails if the degree of
disbelief in that story is sufficiently strong. The standard of
proof puts an equal burden on plaintiff and defendant.
Why is all this important? This Article has shown that the
standards of proof, properly understood without a probabilistic
overlay, present no critical theoretical problems and produce
desirable results. The multivalent-belief model clarifies that the
standards of proof involve comparing degrees of belief in the
truth, and not calculating the odds of a truth to be miracu-
lously revealed. However the human factfinder processes the
evidence, whether element-by-element or by the story method,
the standards of proof will then logically work toward error-cost
minimization and fairness. None of this is to say that one must
carry all this multivalent theory around in one's head. To apply
the standards, the factfinder need only listen to the judicial
instructions. In a reassuring conclusion on factfinding, the
common law has evolved over the centuries toward wisdom.
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